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Abstract
This paper addresses the identification of insurance models with multidimen-
sional screening where insurees have private information about their risk and risk
aversion. The model includes a random damage and the possibility of several claims.
Screening of insurees relies on their certainty equivalence. The paper then investi-
gates how data availability on the number of offered coverages and reported claims
affects the identification of the model primitives under four different scenarios. We
show that the model structure is identified despite bunching due to multidimen-
sional screening and/or a finite number of offered coverages. The observed number
of claims plays a key role in the identification of the joint distribution of risk and risk
aversion. In addition, the paper derives all the restrictions imposed by the model
on observables. Our results are constructive with explicit equations for estimation
and model testing.
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1 Introduction
Insurance has been a long studied problem in economics and is in the core of recent empir-
ical research. Seminal papers by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) and Stiglitz (1977) have
provided benchmark models of insurance under private information on insurees’ risk. In
empirical studies, testing adverse selection in risk has generated a large number of papers
with mixed results. See Chiaporri and Salanie´ (2000) for the most well known test and
Cohen and Siegelman (2010) for a survey of empirical findings. The recent empirical
literature shows that adverse selection not only involves heterogeneity in risk but also
in risk aversion, which is also called advantageous selection. See e.g. Finkelstein and
McGarry (2006) in long-term care insurance, Cohen and Einav (2007) in automobile in-
surance, Fang, Keane and Silverman (2008) in health insurance, and Einav, Finkelstein
and Schrimpf (2010) in annuity market. See also Cutler, Finkelstein and McGarry (2008)
and Einav and Finkelstein (2011) for surveys. As noted in these papers, heterogeneity in
risk aversion may contradict the prediction of the benchmark adverse selection models,
i.e., a low risk individual may buy a higher coverage because of high risk aversion and con-
versely. Thus, a model of insurance needs also to incorporate incomplete information in
risk aversion leading to multidimensional screening. This is known to be a difficult theo-
retical problem because of the violation of the Spence-Mirrlees (single-crossing) condition.
See Rochet and Stole (2003) for a survey on multidimensional screening.
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In this paper, we propose a model of insurance that includes private information in
both risk and risk aversion as well as random damages and the possibility of several claims
while endogenizing the contract terms. Following Landsberger and Meilijson (1999), we
consider the certainty equivalence of no insurance as a one-dimensional representation of
insurees’ types as this representation preserves the order of insurees after buying insurance.
For convenience, we assume a constant absolute risk aversion and a nonparametric mixture
of a Poisson distribution for the number of potential claims as they lead to a tractable
form for the certainty equivalence. In the spirit of the theoretical literature, we consider
automobile insurance with coverages of the form premium and deductible. Our model
contains the key ingredients of insurance and can be extended to other insurance markets
such as health by adding (say) a copayment. Thus, the model structure is defined by the
joint distribution of risk and risk aversion and the distribution of damages. Within this
model, we study the identification of the primitives. Identification is a key step for the
econometric and empirical analysis of structural models.
Starting with Koopmans (1949) and Hurwicz (1950), the problem of identification
has a long history. As discussed by Heckman (2001), the labor literature provides sev-
eral examples of the role played by identification in empirical studies. Over the past
fifteen years, it has received much attention with the development of structural models in
empirical industrial organization. See Athey and Haile (2007) for a survey on the identi-
fication of auction models.1 The problem of (nonparametric) identification is important
for several reasons. First, it allows to assess the conditions required (if any) to recover
uniquely the model structure from the observables while minimizing parametric assump-
tions. Second, it highlights which variations in the data allows one to identify each model
primitive. Third, some important questions related to the structural analysis of models
can be addressed once identification is established. One can think of which distribution
of the data can be rationalized by the model, or what restrictions the model imposes on
the observables that can be used to test the model validity.
Several lessons can be drawn from the recent literature on the identification of models
1See also Matzkin (1994, 2007) for the nonparametric identification of models with nonseparable errors.
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with incomplete information. First, the optimal behavior of economic agents plays an
important role. For instance, in contract models, the optimality of the offered payment
is useful in addition to the optimal agents’ behavior. See Perrigne and Vuong (2011) for
a procurement model with adverse selection and moral hazard and Luo, Perrigne and
Vuong (2015) for nonlinear pricing. Thus, in most cases we need to consider both sides
of the market, i.e. the principal and the agent(s), and assume that the observations are
the equilibrium outcomes. Second, one achieves identification with standard identifying
strategies such as instrumental variables and exclusion restrictions, that have been widely
used in the early literature on identification. See Guerre, Perrigne and Vuong (2009) for
the identification of risk aversion in auctions and Berry and Haile (2014) for a recent
contribution to the identification of multinomial choice demand models. Third, the one-
to-one equilibrium mapping between the unobserved agent’s private information and the
observed outcome is a key element on which identification relies. See e.g. Guerre, Perrigne
and Vuong (2000) and Athey and Haile (2007) in the context of auctions.
Our paper differs from this literature in several dimensions. First, we consider a
model with multidimensional screening in which bunching/pooling cannot be avoided.
In this case, identification cannot rely exclusively on the one-to-one mapping between
the agent’s unobserved types and his observed outcome/action.2 Second, our model also
considers the possibility of a finite number of options/contracts offered to each agent,
while agents’ types are distributed over a continuum. In addition to the bunching arising
from multidimensional screening, additional bunching arises because of a finite number of
contracts. This represents an additional challenge in the study of identification.3
2Relying on Rochet and Chone (1998), Pioner (2007) addresses the semiparametric identification of
bidimensional screening models in a nonlinear pricing context but assumes that one of the two agent’s
types is observed by the analyst. Aryal (2015) considers nonparametric identification with multidimen-
sional types. See also Luo, Perrigne and Vuong (2012, 2013) who study identification of nonlinear pricing
models with multiple types relying on Armstrong (1996) model. The latter papers use optimality of both
the principal and the agent as well as observations from multiple markets to identify the model primitives.
3 Crawford and Shum (2007) consider two contracts while agents’ types can take only two values
thereby avoiding any bunching. Gayle and Miller (2015) adopt a similar strategy. Leslie (2004) entertains
a finite number of price options through a discrete choice model to analyze consumers’ behavior taking
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To study identification of the model primitives and assess how data availability affects
identification, we proceed as follows. We consider several data scenarios depending on the
number of offered coverages and reported claims, namely whether the number of coverages
is a continuum or finite and whether the claims contain all the information, or only those
above the deductible. This strategy allows us to assess how data constraint or limit the
identification of primitives, and which identifying assumptions are needed. Moreover,
studying the identification under a continuum of coverages is important as a negative
identification result would imply nonidentification of the model primitives under a finite
number of coverages. A first data scenario exploits the one-to-one mapping between the
level of certainty equivalence and the deductible to identify the distribution of certainty
equivalence. The number of claims then plays a crucial role in identifying the joint
distribution of risk and risk aversion. A second data scenario maintains a continuum of
contracts but considers a damage distribution truncated at the deductible. Because a
continuum of contracts is offered, the subpopulation choosing full insurance, i.e., a zero
deductible, identifies the damage distribution and the argument of the first case applies.
When considering a finite number of contracts in the third and the fourth scenarios,
identification becomes more challenging as we cannot exploit a one-to-one mapping be-
tween (say) the deductible and the insuree’s private information. Though the context is
different, the number of claims continues to play a key role in identifying the marginal
distribution of risk. Regarding the identification of the joint distribution of risk and risk
aversion, we exploit an exclusion restriction and a full support assumption requiring suf-
ficient variations in some exogenous characteristics. Under these assumptions, the model
structure is identified when the damage distribution is fully observed. On the other hand,
when the damage distribution is truncated at the deductible, we obtain identification
of the structure up to the knowledge of the probability that the damage is below the
deductible. The latter probability is not identified. We then discuss some identifying
assumptions for the probability of damage below the deductible. A notable feature of
our results under a finite number of contracts is that they do not rely on the optimality
the price schedule as exogenous.
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of the offered coverages. Consequently, our results apply to any form of competition in
the insurance industry. To complete these results, we derive all the model restrictions
on the observables in the fourth data scenario. These restrictions can be used to test
the validity of the model and its assumptions. For instance, a model restriction allows
a test of optimality of the offered coverages. This contrasts with the previous literature
as discussed above, and our results represent a novel perspective to the identification of
models under incomplete information. In addition, all our results are constructive and
provide explicit equations for estimation and testing.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Sections 3 and 4 study
identification under a continuum of contracts and under a finite number of contracts,
respectively. Section 5 discusses some identifying strategies for the damage probability
below the deductible and derives all the restrictions imposed by the model on observables.
Section 6 concludes with future lines of research. An appendix collects the proofs.
2 A Model of Insurance
This section develops a model in which insurees have private information about their risk
and risk aversion. The presence of multiple private information leads to multidimensional
screening with pooling at equilibrium. See Rochet and Stole (2003) for a survey. Following
Landsberger and Meilijson (1999), we use the concept of certainty equivalence to rank and
screen insurees. To fix ideas and in the spirit of the early literature, we consider automobile
insurance as an example throughout the paper though our framework also applies to (say)
homeowner and rental insurance. See the end of this section for a discussion of health
insurance.
The Benchmark Model by Stiglitz
This section briefly reviews the Stiglitz (1977) model and motivates our model that
incorporates heterogenous preferences and a random damage/expense. It also introduces
basic notations. Insurees are characterized by a probability of accident (risk) θ ∈ [θ, θ]
distributed as F (·) with a density f(·). An accident involves a fixed damage D affecting
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the insuree’s wealth w. Because agents are risk averse, they buy insurance by paying a
premium t. The insurance company requires a deductible dd for each accident. Upon
buying insurance, the agent’s wealth is w− t in the event of no accident with probability
1− θ and w− t−D+ (D− dd) = w− t− dd in the event of an accident with probability
θ. His expected utility is then V (t, dd; θ) = (1− θ)U(w− t) + θU(w− t− dd), where U(·)
is a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function, which is continuous, strictly increasing
and concave. The risk θ is private information while U(·) is known by the insurer.
In an incomplete information setting, the insurance company offers contracts of the
form [t(θ), dd(θ)] that are incentive compatible. The firm’s profit from a θ-insuree is
pi(θ) = (1− θ)t(θ) + θ[t(θ)−D + dd(θ)] = t(θ)− θ(D− dd(θ)). Because risk is unknown,
the insurance company maximizes its expected profit subject to the insuree’s incentive
compatibility (IC) and participation (IR) constraints, namely
max
t(·),dd(·)
∫ θ
θ
pi(θ)f(θ)dθ
s.t. − t′(θ)− dd′(θ) = 1− θ
θ
t′(θ)
U ′(w − t(θ))
U ′(w − t(θ)− dd(θ)) (IC)
V (t(θ), dd(θ); θ) ≥ (1− θ)U(w) + θU(w −D) (IR),
where the RHS of (IR) expresses the agent’s expected utility with no insurance.4
The main findings of this model are as follows. First, pooling is not optimal and the
firm benefits from offering a continuum of contracts. The individual with the highest risk,
i.e., θ, is offered full insurance with a zero deductible. Second, premium and deductible
are inversely related. In addition, the premium is a convex function of the deductible
implying a larger marginal price for lower deductibles. Third, the optimal coverage may
entail some optimal exclusion for insurees with a low probability of accident.
Though insurance contracts can include several features such as copayments and
hard limits, it is worth noting that Arrow (1963) shows the optimality of the premium-
deductible contract. Intuitively, the latter allows the best risk-sharing between a risk neu-
tral insurer and a risk averse insuree as it is the best compromise between the willingness
4Because U(w) − U(w − D) > 0, there is no countervailing incentives as defined by Lewis and Sap-
pington (1989).
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to reduce risk and the need to limit the insurance deadweight cost. Furthermore, Gollier
and Schlesinger (1993) show that any other form of insurance contract is dominated by a
contract with a deductible and a premium implying that the deductible-premium coverage
maximizes insurer’s profit over all other possible forms of implementable contracts.
The above model assumes at most one accident with a fixed damage and the same
(known) risk aversion across insurees. In reality, there might be more than one accident
over the policy period and every accident involves a random damage. Moreover, as shown
by Finkelstein and McGarry (2006) and Cohen and Einav (2007), the variability in risk
aversion might be more important than the variability in risk across insurees. It is also
natural to consider that insuree’s risk aversion is as private as his probability of accident.
Consequently, asymmetric information becomes bidimensional. Ignoring heterogeneity in
risk aversion may have serious consequences on insurance policy design. For instance, an
insuree with a low probability of accident and a high risk aversion may buy a contract
with a high level of coverage (or low deductible) and conversely. This is also known as
advantageous selection in the insurance literature. In contrast, when heterogeneity in risk
aversion is ignored as in the above model, this insuree should buy a low level of coverage.
In addition, the distribution of damages as well as the expected number of accidents have
an important impact on the choice of deductible relative to the premium offered by the
insurer. In view of this discussion, our model includes multiple accidents with random
damage and heterogeneity in privately known risk aversion. In view of data availability,
our model also considers a finite number of offered contracts/coverages.
Model Assumptions
We make the following assumptions. In our model, θ is the insuree’s risk measured as
the expected number of accidents over the period of coverage.
Assumption A1:
(i) The insuree’s utility function exhibits Constant Absolute Risk Aversion (CARA), i.e.,
U(x; a) = − exp(−ax), a > 0,
(ii) The pairs (θ, a) are i.i.d. as F (·, ·) which is twice continuously differentiable on its
support Θ×A = [θ, θ]× [a, a] ⊂ IR++ × IR++,
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(iii) Each insuree may be involved in J accidents, which conditional on θ, follows a Poisson
distribution, i.e. pj(θ) = Pr[J = j|θ] = e−θθj/j!,
(iv) J is independent across insurees and each accident involves a damage Dj, j =
1, . . . , J . The damages are i.i.d as H(·) on support [0, d] ⊂ IR+,
(v) Dj, j = 1, . . . , J is independent of (θ, a).
By A1-(i), the utility function is strictly increasing and concave. The CARA specifi-
cation has two main advantages: (i) It leads to a tractable expression for the certainty
equivalence and (ii) the attitude toward risk in changes in wealth is independent of initial
wealth. These properties have made the CARA utility a popular choice in the theoretical
and empirical literature. By A1-(ii), each insuree is characterized by a pair (θ, a) which is
private information. Assumption A1-(iii) specifies the distribution of accidents as Poisson
with mean θ. This distribution is widely used in actuarial science to model the number of
accidents. The combination of the CARA utility and the Poisson distribution is especially
convenient as it leads to explicit expressions for the certainty equivalence defined later.
Since θ is random by A1-(ii), and its marginal distribution is left unspecified, the distribu-
tion of the number of accidents in the population is a nonparametric mixture of Poisson
distribution thereby adding flexibility.5 Relaxing the CARA and/or Poisson specifications
is possible at the cost of obtaining implicit expressions for the certainty equivalence. Our
identification results of Section 3 and 4 would still hold provided the distribution of the
number of accidents belongs to the class of distributions whose nonparametric mixture is
identified. See Rao (1992). By A1-(iv,v), damages are random, mutually independent and
independent of types (θ, a). We view the damage as being affected by exogenous factors
such as bad luck, weather or road conditions. Its independence with (θ, a) excludes moral
hazard as (say) risk averse agents’ action might reduce the damage per accident. This
issue is left for future research. Section 5.2 discusses how A1-(iv,v) can be tested in view
of the restriction it implies on observables.
Lastly, following Stiglitz (1977) and empirical papers such as Cohen and Einav (2007)
among others, we assume the insurer acts as a monopolist. The concentration ratios and
5Cohen and Einav (2007) consider a log normal mixture of Poisson distribution.
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the profits made in the insurance industry indicate that it is not a competitive market.
See Chiappori, Julien, Salanie and Salanie (2006) for automobile insurance and Dafny
(2010) and Starc (2014) for health insurance. For instance, switching costs for automobile
and home insurance and/or the limited number of employer offered coverages in health
insurance may prevent insurees to benefit from competition. See Israel (2005a,b) and
Honka (2014) for evidence in the automobile industry. Considering an oligopoly would
add great complexity to the model because of the increasing dimension of adverse selection
due to product differentiation. In view of this, we consider the monopoly as a reasonable
trade-off.
The model primitives [F (·, ·), H(·)] are common knowledge. The timing is as follows.
Each insuree draws independently a pair of types (θ, a) from F (·, ·). The insurance com-
pany proposes a menu of insurance contracts of the form [t, dd], where dd is the deductible
per accident. The insuree chooses the contract that maximizes his utility and pays the
corresponding premium. In case of an accident with damage below the deductible, the
insuree pays for it. Otherwise, the insurer pays the damage above the deductible and the
insuree pays the deductible.
Insurer’s Optimization Problem
The insurer offers a continuum of contracts [t(θ, a), dd(θ, a)] for (θ, a) ∈ Θ×A. Inte-
grating over (θ, a), the insurer’s expected profit is given by
E[pi(θ, a)] =
∫
Θ×A
[
t(θ, a)− θ
∫ d
0
max{0, D − dd(θ, a)}dH(D)
]
dF (θ, a)
=
∫
Θ×A
[
t(θ, a)− θ
∫ d
dd(θ,a)
(1−H(D))dD
]
dF (θ, a), (1)
where max{0, D − dd(θ, a)} reflects that the insurer only covers the damage above the
deductible. The first equality uses that damages are i.i.d conditional on (θ, a) by A1-
(iv,v) while the second equality follows from integration by parts. The inside integral is
the expected payment per accident while θ is the expected number of accidents.
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For a (θ, a)-individual with wealth w, his expected utility without insurance is
V (0, 0; θ, a) = p0(θ)U(w; a) + p1(θ)E[U(w −D1; a)] + p2(θ)E[U(w −D1 −D2; a)] + . . .
= −p0(θ)e−aw − p1(θ)e−awE[eaD1 ]− p2(θ)e−awE[eaD1 ]E[eaD2 ]− . . .
= −e−aw [p0(θ) + p1(θ)φa + p2(θ)φ2a + . . .]
= −e−awe−θ
(
1 +
θφa
1!
+
θ2φ2a
2!
+ . . .
)
= −e−aw+θ(φa−1), (2)
where φa = E[e
aD] > 1, and the expectation is with respect to D. The first equality
considers all the possibilities regarding the number of accidents and their costs to an
individual without insurance. The second equality uses the CARA utility function and
the independence of damages across accidents by A1-(i,iv,v). The third equality uses
damages being identically distributed by A1-(iv). Lastly, the fourth equality relies on
the Poisson distribution of accidents by A1-(iii). Using the same derivation where w
and Dj are replaced by w − t and min{dd,Dj}, respectively, the expected utility of a
(θ, a)-individual buying insurance (t, dd) is
V (t, dd; θ, a) = −e−a(w−t)+θ(φ∗a−1), (3)
where φ∗a = E[e
amin{dd,D}] =
∫
eamin{dd,D}dH(D) =
∫ dd
0
eaDdH(D) + eadd(1−H(dd)) > 1.
We remark that φ∗a < φa as min{dd,D} ≤ D.
Given a menu of contracts, the (θ, a)-individual chooses the contract that maximizes
his expected utility as defined above. Following the revelation principle, we can focus on
a direct mechanism that maps types to contract terms, i.e. [t(θ, a), dd(θ, a)]. The insurer,
however, should choose implementable contracts that satisfy the insuree’s optimization
or (IC) constraint as well as the insuree’s participation or (IR) constraint. This gives the
following optimization problem
max
t(·,·),dd(·,·)
E[pi(θ, a)] (4)
s.t. V [t(θ, a), dd(θ, a); θ, a] ≥ V [t(θ˜, a˜), dd(θ˜, a˜); θ, a] ∀(θ˜, a˜) ∈ Θ×A (IC)
V [t(θ, a), dd(θ, a); θ, a] ≥ V (0, 0; θ, a) ∀(θ, a) ∈ Θ×A (IR),
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where the expected profit is given in (1). The (IC) constraint ensures that the (θ, a)-
individual chooses the contract (t(θ, a), dd(θ, a)). The (IR) constraint guarantees that
buying this contract is better for this individual than having no insurance.
As is well known, multidimensional types leads to a complex screening problem. See
Rochet and Stole (2003). As noted previously, an insuree with high risk but low risk
aversion might have the same willingness to pay for a given coverage (t, dd) as an insuree
with low risk but high risk aversion. This substitutability between risk and risk aversion
implies that a separating equilibrium, where each individual (θ, a) gets a unique coverage,
is infeasible. Thus, pooling occurs across insurees. Intuitively, insurees have two sources
of private information while the insurer has in fact a single instrument, the deductible, to
screen insurees. Indeed, the premium and deductible are inversely related as a contract
(t, dd) will be always preferred to any other contract (t, dd′) with dd′ > dd. Thus, the
insurer’s objective is to find the best way to pool insurees such that offered coverages are
feasible, i.e., satisfy the (IC) and (IR) constraints, while maximizing its expected profit.6
Certainty Equivalence
Following Landsberger and Meilijson (1999), we use the certainty equivalence of no
insurance as a one-dimensional aggregation of the two dimensions of private information.
A similar aggregation approach was proposed by Laffont, Maskin and Rochet (1987).7
Screening based on certainty equivalence has two main advantages. First, it does not
rely as much on parametric specifications of the model primitives. Second, certainty
equivalence has a natural economic interpretation. See also Armstrong (1996) who uses
the production cost for a multiproduct firm to screen consumers with multidimensional
types. We make the following assumption.
6A simple argument shows that screening on risk or risk aversion only is not optimal for the insurer.
Consider three individuals (θ1, a1), (θ2, a1) and (θ2, a2) with θ1 < θ2 and a1 < a2, then having (say) the
first and second buying the same coverage is not optimal for the insurer’s profit.
7See also Ivaldi and Martimort (1994) for an application to competitive nonlinear pricing. For alter-
native approaches, see (say) Wilson (1993) who adopt a partitioning of the types set into one-dimension
subsets, Rochet and Chone (1998) who propose a general approach for multidimensional screening when
the number of types is equal to the number of instruments, and Basov (2001) for the general case.
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Assumption A2: For any given coverage (t, dd), the difference V (t, dd; θ, a)−V (0, 0; θ, a)
is increasing in a.
We remark that the above difference is automatically increasing in θ. Thus, individuals
with higher risk or risk aversion value insurance more than those with lower risk or risk
aversion. Assumption A2 ensures that there will be no countervailing incentives because
the (IR) constraint in (4), namely V (t, dd; θ, a)−V (0, 0; θ, a) ≥ 0 has a LHS increasing in
both (θ, a). We note that A2 restricts the coverage (t, dd) for a (θ, a)-individual relative
to the damage distribution. This assumption can be verified ex-post upon identification
of the model primitives.
The certainty equivalence CE(0, 0; θ, a) of no insurance coverage is defined by the
amount of certain wealth for the insuree that will give him the same level of utility when
he has no coverage, i.e., − exp(−aCE(0, 0; θ, a)) = V (0, 0; θ, a). Thus, by (2)
CE(0, 0; θ, a) = w − θ(φa − 1)
a
. (5)
The certainty equivalence CE(t, dd; θ, a) of having the coverage (t, dd) is defined similarly
as the amount of certain wealth for the insuree that will give him the same level of utility
when buying coverage, i.e. − exp(−aCE(t, dd; θ, a)) = V (t, dd; θ, a). Thus, by (3)
CE(t, dd; θ, a) = w − t− θ(φ
∗
a − 1)
a
. (6)
The next lemma establishes the monotonicity in (θ, a) of these certainty equivalences. All
proofs are in the Appendix.
Lemma 1: The certainty equivalences (5) and (6) are both decreasing in risk and risk
aversion.
The certainty equivalence of no insurance in (5) defines a locus of pairs (θ, a) as a
downward sloping curve θ(a) for any given value s of certainty equivalence. Because
s ≡ CE(0, 0; θ, a) is a function of (θ, a), namely s(θ, a), it is random and distributed as
K(·) with some density k(·) on [s, s], where s = s(θ, a) and s = s(θ, a), respectively.
Figure 1 displays some s-isocurves.
Solving the Multidimensional Screening Problem
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Figure 1: Certainty Equivalence
The optimization problem (4) is known to be difficult to solve because of multidi-
mensional private information and the loss of the single-crossing property. The literature
on multidimensional screening shows that pooling at equilibrium cannot be avoided. To
make the parallel with the literature on multidimensional screening with a focus on non-
linear pricing, we remark that the premium t plays the role of the payment and −dd
plays the role of the quantity as seen in (3) and (6). Thus, dd is the only instrument
for two dimensional types. The certainty equivalence without insurance aggregates these
two dimensions into a single one. We then rewrite the optimization problem (4) in terms
of s ≡ CE(0, 0; θ, a) and the (IC) and (IR) constraints using the certainty equivalences
CE(t, dd; θ, a) and CE(0, 0; θ, a). Cohen and Einav (2007) also use the certainty equiva-
lence to explain the choice of coverage by insurees.
Here, we consider a continuum of contracts [t(s), dd(s)] for s ∈ [s, s]. Thus all insurees
with the same value of certainty equivalence s are pooled. Intuitively, the insuree with the
highest outside option or the highest certainty equivalence will be treated as the individual
with the lowest willingness-to-pay or the lowest risk individual in Stiglitz (1977). The
insurer needs to propose an attractive coverage with a high deductible to induce truth-
telling and participation because he values insurance the least. On the other hand, the
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individual with the lowest outside option or the lowest certainty equivalence is offered full
coverage or dd = 0 as shown later. Landsberger and Meilijson (1999) show that optimal
insurance contracts preserve the order of certainty equivalence, i.e., for any pair of types
(θ, a) and (θ′, a′) such that s(θ, a) < s(θ′, a′) or s < s′, the optimal contract [t(s), dd(s)]
satisfies s(θ, a) ≤ CE(t(s), dd(s); θ, a) < s(θ′, a′) ≤ CE(t(s′), dd(s′); θ′, a′). The first and
third inequalities come from the (IR) constraints, i.e., an individual will buy insurance if
his utility is larger than not buying insurance. This property ensures that screening on s
is implementable.
We rewrite the expected profit (1) in terms of s. Noting t(θ, a) = t(s) and dd(θ, a) =
dd(s) and making the change of variables (θ, a) to (θ, s) in (1) give
E[pi] =
∫ s
s
[
t(s)− E(θ|s)
∫ d
dd(s)
(1−H(D))dD
]
k(s)ds, (7)
where k(·) is the density of certainty equivalence s. The (IC) and (IR) constraints in (4)
become
CE(t(s), dd(s); θ, a) ≥ CE(t(s˜), dd(s˜); θ, a) ∀s˜ ∈ [s, s] (IC)
CE(t(s), dd(s); θ, a) ≥ s, (IR)
for all (θ, a) satisfying CE(0, 0; θ, a) = s and all s ∈ [s, s]. The schedule [t(s), dd(s)] can
be converted into the nonlinear premium t+(dd) ≡ t[s−1(dd)] which is decreasing and
convex in deductible, i.e. the marginal price for higher coverage is increasing. This is
similar to the concavity of tariff in nonlinear pricing models. See (say) Tirole (1988).
We note that for each s there must exist at least one (θ, a)-individual or equivalently
(θ(s), a(s))-individual for whom the (IC) constraint binds. Thus, for this individual the
(IC) constraint can be written as
max
s˜∈[s,s]
CE(t(s˜), dd(s˜);θ(s),a(s))=max
s˜∈[s,s]
w−t(s˜)−
θ(s)
[∫ dd(s˜)
0
ea(s)DdH(D)+ea(s)dd(s˜)[1−H(dd(s˜))]−1
]
a(s)
,
leading to the local (IC) constraint given by the first-order condition at s˜ = s
t′(s) = −θ(s)ea(s)dd(s)[1−H(dd(s))]dd′(s),
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where θ(s) = a(s)(w − s)/[φa − 1] and the prime indicates a derivative. This gives
dd′(s) = −η(s, a(s), dd(s))t′(s), (8)
for all s ∈ [s, s], where
η(s, a(s), dd(s)) =
φa − 1
a(s)(w − s)ea(s)dd(s)[1−H(dd(s))] > 0. (9)
Equation (8) is the local incentive compatibility constraint for the insurer’s optimization
problem. Regarding the individual rationality constraint, in view of the previous discus-
sion, the s-individual has the largest outside option of no insurance. Thus, the insurer
should bind the (IR) constraint for this individual and make him indifferent between
buying insurance or not. This gives the (IR) constraint
CE(t(s), dd(s); θ, a) = s. (10)
We can now solve the insurer’s problem which is to maximize his expected profit (7)
subject to (8) and (10). Applying the Pontryagin principle (see Appendix), the optimal
coverage (t(s), dd(s)) is solution of
η(s, a(s), dd(s))E(θ|s)[1−H(dd(s))]
+
K(s)
k(s)
1
η(s, a(s), dd(s))
[
−∂η(s, a(s), dd(s))
∂dd
dd′(s) + η′(s, a(s), dd(s))
]
=1, (11)
dd′(s) = −η(s, a(s), dd(s))t′(s), (12)
where η′(s, a(s), dd(s)) denotes the total derivative of η(s, a(s), dd(s)) with respect to s,
with the boundary condition CE(t(dd(s)), dd(s); θ, a) = s. Evaluating (11) at s, i.e. for
the (θ, a) individual, shows that dd(s) = 0, i.e. the highest risk/risk averse individual
is offered full coverage as in the benchmark model of Stiglitz (1977).8 The next lemma
implies that the deductible at equilibrium is increasing in s.
Lemma 2: An insurance contract [t(s), dd(s)] satisfies the (IC) constraint if and only if
dd(s) is increasing in s.
8Because K(s) = 0, (11) and (9) give [φa − 1]E(θ|s)/[a(w − s)eadd(s)] = 1. Using (5) and E(θ|s) = θ
give eadd(s) = 1.
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Since the equilibrium contract satisfies the (IC) constraint, its deductible is increasing in
s. In other words, individuals with lower risk and/or risk aversion have lower coverage
with a larger deductible.
Finite Number of Contracts
The principal may offer a finite number C of contracts from which the agent can
choose. To simplify the presentation, we consider C = 2, where C is exogenous. Let
(t1, dd1) and (t2, dd2) with t1 < t2 and dd1 > dd2 be these two contracts. We show how
the insurer can determine these two contracts optimally. In addition to the pooling of
pairs (θ, a) leading to the same certainty equivalence s, there is bunching of agents with
different values of s.
The insurer chooses (t1, dd1, t2, dd2) to maximize his expected profit. Let Sc be the set
of agents choosing the contract (tc, ddc), c = 1, 2. Similarly to (7), we have
E[pi] =
2∑
c=1
∫
Sc
[
tc − θ
∫ d
ddc
(1−H(D))dD
]
dF (θ, a) =
2∑
c=1
νc
[
tc − E[θ|Sc]
∫ d
ddc
(1−H(D))dD
]
,
where the second equality follows from
∫
Sc θdF (θ, a) = νcE[θ|Sc] with νc =
∫
Sc dF (θ, a)
being the proportion of insurees choosing contract c. The optimal contracts also need to
satisfy the incentive compatibility and participation constraints:
CE(tc, ddc; θ, a) ≥ CE(tc′ , ddc′ , θ, a), c 6= c′, ∀(θ, a) ∈ Sc, c = 1, 2,
CE(tc, ddc; θ, a) ≥ CE(0, 0; θ, a), ∀(θ, a) ∈ Sc, c = 1, 2.
The (IC) constraint reduces to two subsets S1 and S2 that partition Θ×A such that
individuals in S1 and S2 choose (t1, dd1) and (t2, dd2), respectively. The frontier between
S1 and S2 is determined by the locus of (θ, a)-insurees who are indifferent between the
two contracts, i.e., for whom CE(t1, dd1; θ, a) = CE(t2, dd2; θ, a). Using (6), the frontier
is the strictly decreasing curve in Θ×A defined by
θ(a) =
a(t2 − t1)[∫ dd1
0
eaDdH(D) + eadd1(1−H(dd1))−
∫ dd2
0
eaDdH(D)− eadd2(1−H(dd2))
]
=
t2 − t1∫ dd1
dd2
eaD(1−H(D))dD
, (13)
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where the second equality uses integration by parts. Regarding the (IR) constraints, the
only one that binds is for the (θ, a)-insuree, i.e. CE(t1, dd1; θ, a) = s.
Maximizing E[pi] with respect to (t1, dd1, t2, dd2) subject to the (IC) and (IR) con-
straints gives the first-order conditions
ν1 +
∫ a∗
a
[
t1−θ(a)
{∫ d
dd1
(1−H(D))dD
}]
f(θ(a), a)
∂θ(a)
∂t1
da
−
∫ a
a∗
[
t2−θ(a)
{∫ d
dd2
(1−H(D))dD
}]
f(θ(a), a)
∂θ(a)
∂t1
da = ρ (14)
∫ a∗
a
[
t1−θ(a)
{∫ d
dd1
(1−H(D))dD
}]
f(θ(a), a)
∂θ(a)
∂dd1
da+ E[θ|S1]ν1(1−H(dd1))
−
∫ a
a∗
[
t2−θ(a)
{∫ d
dd2
(1−H(D))dD
}]
f(θ(a), a)
∂θ(a)
∂dd1
da−ρθeadd1(1−H(dd1)) = 0(15)∫ a∗
a
[
t1−θ(a)
{∫ d
dd1
(1−H(D))dD
}]
f(θ(a), a)
∂θ(a)
∂t2
da
+ν2 −
∫ a
a∗
[
t2−θ(a)
{∫ d
dd2
(1−H(D))dD
}]
f(θ(a), a)
∂θ(a)
∂t2
da = 0 (16)
∫ a∗
a
[
t1−θ(a)
{∫ d
dd1
(1−H(D))dD
}]
f(θ(a), a)
∂θ(a)
∂dd2
da+ E(θ|S2)ν2(1−H(dd2))
−
∫ a
a∗
[
t2−θ(a)
{∫ d
dd2
(1−H(D))dD
}]
f(θ(a), a)
∂θ(a)
∂dd2
da = 0, (17)
t1 =
θ
a
[∫ d
dd1
(
eaD − eadd1) dH(D)] (18)
where ρ is the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the (IR) constraint and a∗ is the
minimum of a and the value which solves (13) evaluated at θ.
Extensions
Our model extends to other insurance contracts such as health. Up to some variations,
health insurance involves a premium t as well as a per period deductible dd and a co-
payment γ per medical procedure/visit. In particular, and in contrast to the automobile
insurance, the deductible is not per visit while the copayment arises in the first proce-
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dure/visit after the deductible is met. In this case, for a contract [t(θ, a), dd(θ, a), γ(θ, a)],
the insurer’s expected profit (1) becomes
E[pi(θ, a)] =
∫
Θ×A
{t(θ, a)− E [1I(D1 + . . .+DJ > dd(θ, a)) (D1 + . . .+DJ
−dd(θ, a)− γ(θ, a)(J − J†))]} dF (θ, a),
where the expectation in the integral is with respect to the total expense D1+. . .+DJ , the
number J of visits and J† which is the minimal number of visits for which the deductible
is met, i.e., J† = argminj=1,...,JD1 + . . .+Dj > dd. The per visit expenses Dj, j = 1, . . . , J
may no longer be independent. Indeed, a patient with a medical condition will exhibit
correlated medical expenses over the treatment period. Similarly, the per visit expense
Dj might be correlated with the expected number of medical procedures/visits θ.
Regarding the patient, his expected utility (2) without health insurance becomes
V (0, 0, 0; θ, a) = E[U(w −D1 − . . .−DJ ; a)] = −e−awE[e−a(D1+...+DJ )],
under the CARA utility function by A1-(i), where the expectation is with respect to the
total expense D1 + . . .+DJ and the number J of visits which depends on θ. The expected
utility (3) of a (θ, a)-patient buying coverage (t, dd, γ) becomes
V (t, dd, γ; θ, a) = −e−awE[e−aX ],
where X is the out-of-pocket expense X = (D1 + . . .+DJ)1I(D1 + . . .+DJ ≤ dd) + (dd+
(J − J†)γ)1I(D1 + . . .+DJ > dd). When there is a finite number C of offered coverages,
the insurer partitions the set of types Θ×A using the patients’ certainty equivalences to
maximize his expected profit with respect to the contract terms (tc, ddc, γc), c = 1, . . . , C.
3 Identification with a Continuum of Contracts
In this section, we consider the case in which a continuum of coverages is offered to
each insuree. In particular, our identification analysis shows the key role played by the
number of accidents. The model structure is given by the joint distribution of risk and
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risk aversion F (·, ·) and the damage distribution H(·). Besides the specification of the
CARA utility function and the Poisson distribution for the number of accidents, the
identification problem is nonparametric.9 The problem of identification is to recover
uniquely the structure [F (·, ·), H(·)] from the observables. In the case of a continuum of
contracts, we observe the contract purchased by each insuree (t, dd) and the J claims made
by each insuree with the corresponding amounts of damages (D1, . . . , DJ). In Section 3.2,
we observe J∗ claims with their corresponding damages (D1, . . . , DJ∗) because of the
truncation at the deductible.
We introduce some observed variables X characterizing the insuree and his/her car
that are used by the insurer to discriminate insurees.10 Variables related to the insuree
may contain age, gender, education, marital status, location and driving experience. Vari-
ables related to the insuree’s car may include car mileage, business use, car value, power,
model and make.11 With the introduction of X with values in the support SX ⊂ IRdimX ,
the model structure becomes [F (θ, a|X), H(D|X)] as we expect that such variables affect
the insuree’s risk and risk aversion as well as the damage. For instance, the damage with
an expensive car is likely to be larger than the damage with an inexpensive one. Let
G(·|X) denote the observed deductible distribution conditional on X. It is crucial that
all the variables used by the insurer to discriminate insurees are included in X.
In identification studies of structural models, it is important to define the set of ad-
missible structures that are consistent with the assumptions of the theoretical model. We
formalize such assumptions on the structure and (θ, a, J,D,X). Specifically, the structure
[F (·, ·|X), H(·|X)] belongs to FX ×HX as defined below.
9The problem of identifying nonparametrically the agent’s utility function is quite complex. In the
context of auctions, the bidder’s utility function is not identified in general. Nonparametric identification
is achieved with the help of exclusion restrictions using exogenous variations in the number of bidders
as in Guerre, Perrigne and Vuong (2009) or with the help of additional data from ascending auctions
as in Lu and Perrigne (2008). See also Campo, Guerre, Perrigne and Vuong (2009) for semiparametric
identification when the bidder’s utility function is parameterized as CARA or CRRA.
10Variables that are not used to discriminate insurees can enter in the model through (θ, a) which can
be then viewed as aggregating observed and unobserved heterogeneity.
11We can use the car value as a proxy for wealth w so that w is a variable in X.
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Definition 1: Let FX be the set of conditional distributions F (·, ·|X) satisfying
(i) For every x ∈ SX , F (·, ·|x) is a c.d.f. with compact support Θ(x)×A(x) = [θ(x), θ(x)]×
[a(x), a(x)] ⊂ IR++ × IR++,
(ii) The conditional density f(·, ·|·) > 0 on its support.
Definition 2: Let HX be the set of distributions H(·|X) satisfying
(i) For every x ∈ SX , H(·|x) is a c.d.f with compact support [0, d(x)] ⊂ IR+ with
supx∈SX d(x) < +∞,
(ii) The conditional density h(·|·) > 0 on its support.
Assumption A3: We have
(i) (D1, . . . , DJ) ⊥ (θ, a)
∣∣(J,X).
(ii) (D1, . . . , DJ)
∣∣(J,X) are i.i.d. as H(·|X),
(iii) J ⊥ (X, a)∣∣θ with J |θ ∼ P(θ), i.e. Pr[J = j] = e−θ θj
j!
,
(iv) (θ, a, J,X) is i.i.d. with (θ, a)|X ∼ F (·, ·|X)
Assumption A3 parallels A1 with X. Assumption A3-(i) implies that conditional on X,
the amount of damage does not provide any information on his risk and risk aversion. For
instance, conditional on X, damages depend on exogenous factors that are independent of
(θ, a). In the same spirit, Assumption A3-(ii) says that damages are mutually independent
conditional on X. Regarding Assumption A3-(iii), the number of accidents J depends on
the insuree’s risk θ only, while the Poisson distribution follows the theoretical model of
Section 2, where the insuree’s risk θ is the expected number of accidents. By Assumption
A3-(iv), (θ, a, J,X) is i.i.d. across insurees. We maintain Assumption A3 throughout the
paper. Lastly, this section assumes that the observed (t, dd) correspond to the optimal
coverage schedule so that (11) and (12) are satisfied.
3.1 Case 1: Full Damage Distribution
Case 1 considers a continuum of coverages offered to each insuree as well the observation
of damage for every accident whether it is below or above the deductible. It follows
that H(·|X) is identified on [0, d(X)]. It remains to study the identification of F (·, ·|X).
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For the rest of Section 3, to simplify the notations, we suppress the conditioning on
X. We first proceed by studying the identification of the distribution K(·) of certainty
equivalence (5) of no coverage. The optimal contracts are characterized by (11) and (12).
Equation (11) defines a one-to-one mapping between the certainty equivalence s and the
deductible dd, while (12) defines a one-to-one mapping between dd and t. The key idea is
to exploit the former mapping to identify the distribution of certainty equivalence from
the observed deductible distribution G(·). This result is in the spirit of the nonparametric
identification literature on auctions and contracts.12 We have G(dd) = Pr(d˜d ≤ dd) =
Pr(s(d˜d) ≤ s(dd)) = Pr(s˜ ≤ s(dd)) = K(s) implying g(dd) = k(s)s′(dd), with s(·) being
the inverse of dd(·) by monotonicity of the latter. Hence,
G(dd)
g(dd)
=
K(s)
k(s)
1
s′(dd)
=
K(s)
k(s)
dd′(s).
Substituting the above expression in (11), we obtain
η(s, a(s), dd(s))E[θ|s](1−H(dd))+G(dd)
g(dd)
{
−
∂η(s,a(s),dd(s))
∂dd
η(s, a(s), dd(s))
+
η′(s, a(s), dd(s))
η(s, a(s), dd(s))
s′(dd)
}
=1.
From (12), we have t′+(dd)=−1/η(s, a(s), dd(s)), where t+(dd) ≡ t[s−1(dd)] is the function
relating the deductible to the premium. We also have dt′+(dd(s))/ds = −d[η(s, a(s), dd(s))]−1
/ds, i.e. t′′+(dd) × dd′(s) = η′(s, a(s), dd(s))/[η(s, a(s), dd(s))]2 or equivalently t′′+(dd) =
[η′(s, a(s), dd(s))/[η(s, a(s), dd(s))]2]× s−1′(dd). Using this result, we can rewrite the pre-
vious equation as
E[θ|s](1−H(dd)) + G(dd)
g(dd)
{
−
∂η(s,a(s),dd(s))
∂dd
η(s, a(s), dd(s))2
+ t′′+(dd)
}
= −t′+(dd).
From the definition (9) of η(·, ·, ·), its partial derivative with respect to dd is
∂η(s, a(s), dd(s))
∂dd
= −η(s, a(s), dd(s))
[
a(s)− h(dd)
1−H(dd)
]
.
12For auctions, see Guerre, Perrigne and Vuong (2000) and Athey and Haile (2007) where the mapping
between the observed bid and the unobserved private value identifies the private value distribution. For
contracts, see Luo, Perrigne and Vuong (2015) in the context of nonlinear pricing, and Perrigne and
Vuong (2011) in the context of a procurement model with adverse selection and moral hazard. The
mapping between the observed quantity/ price and the unobserved consumer’s type/firm’s efficiency is
exploited to recover their underlying distribution, respectively.
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Thus, the first-order condition defining the optimal deductible can be rewritten as
E[θ|dd](1−H(dd)) + G(dd)
g(dd)
[
−t′+(dd)
(
a(s)− h(dd)
1−H(dd)
)
+ t′′+(dd)
]
= −t′+(dd),
where E[θ|s] = E[θ|dd] because of the one-to-one mapping between dd and s. After
elementary algebra, we obtain
a(s) =
1
t′+(dd)
{
g(dd)
G(dd)
[
t′+(dd) + E[θ|dd](1−H(dd))
]
+ t′′+(dd)
}
+
h(dd)
1−H(dd) ,
showing that a(s) is identified as the right-hand side is observed or identified from ob-
servables. In particular, E[θ|dd] is identified by the expected number of claims made by
insurees choosing the deductible dd given that all the claims are observed, i.e. E[θ|dd] =
E[J |dd].13 Then, using (8) and (9) we have
s = w +
t′+(dd)(φa − 1)
a(s) exp(a(s)dd)(1−H(dd)) ,
showing that the insuree’s certainty equivalence s can be identified from his choice of
deductible dd and the knowledge of H(·), G(·), t+(·) and E[J |dd]. Thus, we have the
following result.
Lemma 3: Suppose that a continuum of optimal insurance coverages is offered to each
insuree and all accidents are observed. Under A3, the pair [K(·), H(·)] is identified.
It remains to investigate whether we can identify F (·, ·). A sketch of the argument is
as follows. From the moment generating function of the number of accidents J conditional
on s, we identify the moment generating function of θ given s in a neighborhood of zero.
As is well known, the latter identifies Fθ|S(·|·). Once we identify Fθ|S(·|·), we use K(·) to
derive the joint distribution of (θ, s). Identification of the joint density of (θ, a) follows
from the known one-to-one mapping between (θ, s) and (θ, a) given by (5). It is important
to note that the observed number of claims J plays a crucial role in identifying Fθ|S(·|·).
This is possible because the Poisson distribution belongs to the class of distributions
whose nonparametric mixture is identified. See Rao (1992). In contrast, if one only
13We have E[J |dd] = E[J |s] = E{E[J |θ, s]|s} = E{E[J |θ, a]|s} = E{E[J |θ]|s} = E[θ|s], where we have
used A3-(iii) and the one-to-one mapping between (θ, a) and (θ, s).
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observes whether there is an accident with the risk measured by the probability of such
contingency θ˜ = 1−e−θ, then Fθ|S(·|·) is not identified because the nonparametric mixture
of a Binomial distribution does not belong to the aforementioned class and thus is not
identified. See Aryal, Perrigne and Vuong (2009).
Formally, for a given certainty equivalence s, the subpopulation of insurees with cov-
erage (t(s), dd(s)) and their corresponding claims give the moment generating function
MJ |S(·|s) as
MJ |S(t|s) = E[eJt|S = s] = E
{
E[eJt|θ, S]|S = s}
= E
{
E[eJt|θ, a]|S = s} = E{E[eJt|θ]|S = s}
= E
{
eθ(e
t−1)|S = s
}
= Mθ|S(et − 1|s), (19)
where the third equality follows from the one-to-one mapping between (θ, s) and (θ, a)
and the fourth and fifth equalities from A3-(iii) using the moment generating function of
the Poisson distribution with parameter θ. In particular, (19) shows that the moment
generating function MJ |S(·|s) exists for every t ∈ IR because θ has a compact support
given S = s. Moreover, letting u = et − 1 shows that
Mθ|S(u|s) = MJ |S(log(1 + u)|s)
for all u ∈ (−1,+∞). Thus Mθ|S(·|s) is identified on a neighborhood of 0 thereby identi-
fying Fθ|S(·|s). See e.g. Billingsley (1995, p. 390).14
The joint density of (θ, s) is f(θ, s) = f(θ|s)k(s), which is identified. From the known
one-to-one mapping T (·, ·) that transforms (θ, a)′ into (θ, s)′, namely T (θ, a) = [θ, w −
[θ(φa − 1)]/a]′ with φa =
∫
eaDdH(D) and H(·) known, we recover f(θ, a) as
f(θ, a) = fθS(T
−1(θ, a))
∣∣∣∣∣∂T−1(θ, a)∂(θ, a)
∣∣∣∣∣.
14Alternatively, because Mθ|S(·|s) exists in a neighborhood of 0, then all the moments of θ given S = s
are identified by M
(k)
θ|S(0|s) = E[θk|S = s] for k = 0, 1, . . . ,∞. Since θ given s has compact support, we
are in the class of Hausdorff moment problems, which are always determinate, i.e., the distribution of θ
given s is uniquely determined by its moments.
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This result is formally stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 1: Suppose that a continuum of optimal insurance coverages is offered to
each insuree and all accidents are observed. Under A3, the structure [F (·, ·), H(·)] is
identified.
3.2 Case 2: Truncated Damage Distribution
We maintain the assumption that the insurer offers a continuum of optimal contracts
to each insuree but we now consider that the damage distribution is not fully observed.
Making abstraction of dynamic considerations, an accident leads to a claim if and only
if the damage is above the deductible. Thus, we can identify the truncated damage
distribution on [dd, d]. However, the deductible dd varies across insurees. In particular,
for insurees buying full insurance, the deductible is zero thereby identifying the damage
distribution on its full support [0, d]. Formally, HD|dd(·|0) = HD|S(·|s) = HD|(θ,a)(·|θ, a) =
HD(·) by A3-(i). Thus, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 4: Under A3, H(·) is identified.
It remains to study the identification of F (·, ·). Though the reported number of
accidents J∗ is observed, instead of the true J , the argument is similar to Case 1.
Specifically, reviewing the argument leading to Lemma 3, K(·) is identified if E[θ|dd]
is. Since accidents are reported only if the damage is above the deductible, we have
E[θ|dd] 6= E[J∗|dd], where J∗ is the number of reported accidents. But J∗ given (J, dd) is
distributed as a Binomial with parameters (J, 1−H(dd)) by A3-(i,ii). Thus, E[J∗|dd] =
E{E[J∗|J, dd]|dd} = E[J(1−H(dd))|dd] = (1−H(dd))E[J |dd] = (1−H(dd))E[θ|dd], i.e.
E[θ|dd] = E[J∗|dd]/(1−H(dd)). Hence, E[θ|dd] is identified despite the truncated damage
distribution leading to the identification of K(·).
Turning to the identification of F (θ, a), we proceed as in Section 3.1. The moment
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generating function of J∗ given s is
MJ∗|S(t|s) = E[eJ∗t|S = s] = E{E[eJ∗t|J, S]|S = s} = E{E[eJ∗t|J, dd]|S = s}
= E
{
[H(dd) + (1−H(dd))et]J |S = s} = E{eJ log[H(dd)+(1−H(dd))et]|S = s}
= Mθ|S
[
elog[H(dd)+(1−H(dd))e
t] − 1|s
]
= Mθ|S[(1−H(dd))(et − 1)|s], (20)
where the fourth equality uses the moment generating function of the Binomial distribu-
tion B(J, 1−H(dd)), and the fifth equality uses (19) with t replaced by log[H(dd) + (1−
H(dd))et]. Thus, we obtain
Mθ|S(u|s) = MJ∗|S
[
log
(
1 +
u
1−H(dd)
) ∣∣∣s] ,
for u ∈ (−(1 − H(dd),+∞). The rest of the argument in Case 1 applies leading to the
following proposition.
Proposition 2: Suppose that a continuum of optimal insurance coverages is offered to
each insuree and accidents are observed if and only if the damage is above the deductible.
Under A3, the structure [F (·, ·), H(·)] is identified.
4 Identification with a Finite Number of Contracts
We now address the identification of the model when only (say) two contracts are offered
given X. The identification argument can no longer rely on the identification of the
density of certainty equivalence as we cannot exploit the one-to-one mapping between the
insuree’s certainty equivalence and his deductible choice. There is a continuum of s ∈ [s, s]
values, while there are only a finite number of deductibles. Consequently, the FOCs (14)–
(18) characterizing (t1, dd1, t2, dd2) will not allow us to identify F (θ, a). In addition to
the key role played by the observed number of claims, we exploit sufficient variations in
exogenous variables to achieve identification. A notable feature of Section 4 is that we
do not require that the observed coverages (t1, dd1, t2, dd2) are optimal. Consequently,
the results of this section apply beyond the case of monopoly to entertain data from
other forms of competition among insurers. As before, we distinguish whether the full or
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truncated damage distribution is observed. Regarding observables, for each insuree we
need the pair of offered coverages (t1, dd1, t2, dd2), his choice of coverage, the number of
accidents, their corresponding damages and the characteristics X.
4.1 Case 3: Full Damage Distribution
This case is the closest to Cohen and Einav (2007) who identify the joint distribution
of risk and risk aversion under parametric assumptions. In this section, we show how
insuree’s optimal coverage choice with a full support assumption and sufficient variations
in some exogenous characteristics can identify nonparametrically f(θ, a). In view of Co-
hen and Einav (2007) empirical findings, our identification result is important for several
reasons. First, the nonparametric identification of the joint distribution of risk and risk
aversion offers more flexibility on the dependence between risk and risk aversion. Their
empirical findings display a counterintuitive positive correlation between the latter. Sec-
ond, their robustness analysis suggests that the offered contracts are suboptimal with
their estimated positive correlation, i.e., the insurer could increase his profit by adjusting
upward the current low deductibles that are more compatible with a negative correlation.
Our identification results rely on a nonparametric mixture of a Poisson distribution
for the number of claims. Specifically, the probability of the observed claims J conditional
on the characteristics x is given by
Pr[J = j|x] =
∫ θ(x)
θ(x)
e−θ
θj
j!
dFθ|X(θ|x)
where the mixing distribution Fθ|X(·|x) is left unspecified. Given that all the accidents
and damages are observed, the damage distribution H(·|X) is identified. To establish
identification of F (θ, a|X), we proceed as follows. We first show the identification of
Fθ|X(·|·) following an argument similar to Case 1. In the second step, we identify the
conditional distribution Fa|θ,X(·|·, ·) at the frontier a(θ,X) between the two sets S1(X)
and S2(X) that partition Θ(X)×A(X) according to the coverage choices of insurees with
characteristics X. In the third step, we make an exclusion restriction and a full support
assumption involving some characteristics Z included in X to achieve identification of the
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distribution Fa|θ,X(·|·, ·) on its support.
For the first step, we exploit again the observed number of accidents. Using an argu-
ment similar to that leading to (19) for the subpopulation of insurees with characteristics
x, the moment generating function MJ |X(·|x) is
MJ |X(t|x) = E[eJt|X = x] = E
{
E[eJt|θ,X]|X = x,}
= E
{
E[eJt|θ]|X = x} = E{eθ(et−1)|X = x}
= Mθ|X(et − 1|x),
where the third and fourth equalities follow from A3-(iii). Thus, fθ|X(·|·) is identified by
its moment generating function
Mθ|X(u|x) = MJ |X(log(1 + u)|x)
for all u ∈ (−1,+∞).
In the second step, we consider the probability that an insuree with risk θ and charac-
teristics X chooses the coverage (t1(X), dd1(X)) as intuitively this provides information
about the insuree’s risk aversion a. To do so, we define a discrete variable χ, which takes
values 1 and 2 depending on whether the insuree chooses the coverage (t1(X), dd1(X))
or (t2(X), dd2(X)), i.e., whether the insuree’s types (θ, a) belongs to S1(X) or S2(X),
respectively. Thus, χ = 1 is also equivalent to a ≤ a(θ,X), where the latter is the inverse
of the frontier (13), where (t1, dd1, t2, dd2) and H(·) now depends on X. Namely, a(θ,X)
is the inverse of
θ(a,X) =
t2(X)− t1(X)∫ dd1(X)
dd2(X)
eaD(1−H(D|X))dD
.
Our identification strategy below exploits variations of this frontier in X. In particular,
even if the deductible does not vary with X as with US data, the premium and possibly
the damage distribution do depend on X.
The probability of interest can then be written as Pr[χ = 1|θ,X = x], which is
Fa|θ,X [a(θ, x)|θ, x] =
fθ|χ,X(θ|1, x)ν1(x)
fθ|X(θ|x) ,
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by Bayes’ rule, where ν1(x) is the proportion of insurees with characteristics x choosing the
coverage (t1(x), dd1(x)). The latter is identified from the data. Since fθ|X(·|·) is identified
from the first step, it remains to identify fθ|χ,X(·|1, x). Applying the same argument as
in Step 1 but conditioning on χ = 1 as well, we obtain
MJ |χ,X [t|1, x] = E[eJt|χ=1, X=x] = E{E[eJt|θ, a,X]|χ=1, X=x}
= Mθ|χ,X [et − 1|1, x],
where the second equality follows from the equivalence between conditioning on (θ, a, χ)
and conditioning on (θ, a), while the third equality follows, as before, from A3-(iii). Thus,
fθ|χ,X(·|1, ·) is identified by its moment generating function
Mθ|χ,X(u|1, x) = MJ |χ,X(log(1 + u)|1, x)
for all u ∈ (−1,+∞). Hence, Fa|θ,X [a(θ, x)|θ, x] is identified for every θ ∈ [θ(x), θ(x)] and
x ∈ SX .
To conduct policy counterfactuals the analyst may need to identify F (·, ·|x) on the
whole support Θ(x)×A(x). This is the purpose of the third step. To do so, we partition
the vector X into (W,Z). Let SW denote the support of W and SW1|w2 denote the support
of some variable W1 given some variable W2 = w2.
Assumption A4: We have
(i) a ⊥ Z∣∣(θ,W )
(ii) ∀(θ, a, w) ∈ SθaW , there exists z ∈ SZ|θw such that a(θ, w, z) = a.
Assumption A4-(i) is an exclusion restriction, i.e. Z does not affect risk aversion given
risk and other characteristics W . The variable Z needs to be continuous and can be the
car value, the reported annual mileage, the driver’s experience, etc. This gives
Fa|θ,W,Z(a(θ, w, z)|θ, w, z) = Fa|θ,W (a(θ, w, z)|θ, w), ∀(θ, w, z).
Because the left-hand side is identified from the second step, sufficient variations in
a(θ, w, z) due to z can identify Fa|θ,W (·|θ, w). This is the purpose of A4-(ii), which is
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a full support assumption. Similar assumptions (sometimes called large support assump-
tions) have been made in various contexts. See Matzkin (1992, 1993), Lewbel (2000),
Carneiro, Hansen and Heckman (2003), Imbens and Newey (2009) and Berry and Haile
(2014) among others. In our context, this assumption can be interpreted as follows: For
every individual with characteristics (θ, a,W ), there exists some characteristics Z such as
the car value or the mileage for which the insuree is indifferent between the two offered
coverages. The full support assumption is sufficient to guarantee identification since
Fa|θ,W (a|θ, w) = Fa|θ,W [a(θ, w, z)|θ, w] = Fa|θ,W,Z [a(θ, w, z)|θ, w, z],
where the first equality uses the full support assumption and the second equality uses
the exclusion restriction. Note that a(·, ·, ·) is identified in view of (13). The full support
assumption guarantees that for every a on its support, there exists a known value z such
that a = a(θ, w, z). Identification of F (θ, a|w, z) follows using the first step. This result
is formally stated in the next proposition.
Proposition 3: Suppose that two insurance coverages are offered to each insuree and all
accidents are observed for each insuree. Under A3 and A4, the structure [F (·, ·|X), H(·|X)]
is identified.
Despite pooling due to both multidimensional screening, and a finite number of cover-
age, Proposition 3 shows that the model primitives are identified by exploiting wisely
the number of accidents and variations in some exogenous variable. In particular, our
identification argument does not require optimality of the offered coverages. This is novel
in the identification of models under incomplete information.
4.2 Case 4: Truncated Damage Distribution
The data scenario analyzed in Case 4 corresponds to typical insurance data, i.e., a finite
number of contracts offered with claims filed only if damages are above the deductible.
Case 3 has shown that observing a finite number of contracts does not prevent the non-
parametric identification of the joint distribution of risk and risk aversion provided all
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accident information is available and there is enough variation in some excluded exoge-
nous variable. In contrast, the truncation on the damage distribution in Case 4 limits the
extent of identification. Nevertheless, we show that F (·, ·|X) is identified up to the knowl-
edge of the probability to have a damage below the lowest deductible, i.e., H(dd2(X)|X).15
To simplify the notations, we let Hc(X) ≡ H(ddc(X)|X) hereafter.
We note the relationship between 1−H1(X) and 1−H2(X) which allows us to focus
on identification only in terms of 1−H2(X). Because a claim is filed only if it involves a
damage above the deductible, we identify the truncated damage distributions
H∗c (·|X) ≡
H(·|X)−Hc(X)
1−Hc(X)) ,
on [ddc(X), d(X)] from the subpopulation of insurees buying the coverage (tc(X), ddc(X))
for c = 1, 2. Differentiating the above equations and taking their ratio show that
λ(X) ≡ h
∗
2(D|X)
h∗1(D|X)
=
1−H1(X)
1−H2(X) , (21)
for all D ≥ dd1(X), where 0 < λ(X) < 1. In particular, the function λ(·), which is
the ratio of the truncated damage densities, is identified from the data, while H(·|X) is
identified on [dd2(X), d(X)] up to the knowledge of H2(X).
We follow similar steps as in Case 3 with θ˜ ≡ (1−H2(X))θ replacing θ while modifying
the argument as J is unobserved. To identify the marginal density fθ˜|X(·|·) of θ˜ given X,
we exploit the observed number of reported accidents J∗c . Using a similar argument as in
(20), the moment generating function of J∗ given (χ,X), where χ ∈ {1, 2} indicates the
15When two contracts are offered, it is never optimal for the insurer to offer full insurance, i.e. dd2(X) =
0. Therefore, we cannot use the argument of Case 2 to identify H(·|X) and hence H(dd2(X)|X).
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insuree’s contract choice, is
MJ∗|χ,X(t|c, x) = E[eJ∗t|χ = c,X = x]
= E{E[eJ∗t|J, χ,X]|χ = c,X = x}
= E
{
[Hχ(X) + (1−Hχ(X))et]J |χ = c,X = x
}
= E
{
E[eJ log[Hχ(X)+(1−Hχ(X))e
t]|θ, χ,X]|χ = c,X = x
}
= E
[
eθ[Hχ(X)+(1−Hχ(X))e
t−1]|χ = c,X = x
]
= Mθ|χ,X [(1−Hχ(X))(et − 1)|c, x], (22)
where the third equality uses the moment generating function of J∗ given (J, χ,X), which
is distributed as a Binomial B(J, 1−Hχ(X)) using A3-(ii), and the fifth equality follows
from A3-(iii) and the moment generating function of the Poisson distribution. Thus,
Mθ|χ,X [u|c, x] = MJ∗|χ,X
[
log
(
1 +
u
1−Hχ(X)
) ∣∣∣c, x] ,
for u ∈ (−1 + Hχ(X),+∞). In particular, the distribution of risk θ given (χ,X) is
identified up to the knowledge of Hχ(X).
Since θ˜ = (1−H2(X))θ, its moment generating function given (χ,X) is
Mθ˜|χ,X(u|c, x) = Mθ|χ,X(u(1−H2(x))|c, x)
=
 MJ∗|χ,X
[
log
(
1 + u
λ(x)
)
|1, x
]
if c = 1,
MJ∗|χ,X [log (1 + u) |2, x] if c = 2,
(23)
for all u ∈ (−λ(x),+∞) and u ∈ (−1,+∞), respectively. Thus, the moment generating
function of θ˜ given X is
Mθ˜|X(u|x) = E{E[euθ˜|χ,X]|X = x}
= MJ∗|χ,X
[
log
(
1+
u
λ(x)
)
|1, x
]
ν1(x)
+MJ∗|χ,X [log (1+u) |2, x]ν2(x), (24)
for u ∈ (−λ(x),+∞), showing that fθ˜|X(·|·) is identified as λ(X), ν1(X) and ν2(X) are
known from the data. Since fθ|X(θ|x) = (1 − H2(x))fθ˜|X((1 − H2(x))θ|X), the former
density is identified up to H2(x).
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In the second step, as in Case 3, we consider the probability that an insuree with risk θ
and characteristics X chooses the coverage (t1(X), dd1(X)). Using (13) and 1−H(D|X) =
(1−H2(X))(1−H∗2 (D|X)), we remark that the optimal frontier between buying the two
coverages in the space (θ˜, a) is given by
θ˜(a,X) =
t2(X)− t1(X)∫ dd1(X)
dd2(X)
eaD[1−H∗2 (D|X)]dD
, (25)
leading to the inverse a(θ˜, X), which is identified. As before, from Bayes’ rule we have
Fa|θ˜,X(a(θ˜, x)|θ˜, x) =
fθ˜|χ,X(θ˜|1, x)ν1(x)
fθ˜|X(θ˜|x)
, (26)
where ν1(x) and fθ˜|X(θ˜|x) are identified. Moreover, fθ˜|χ,X(·|1, x) is identified because its
moment generating function Mθ˜|χ,X(·|1, x) is identified on (−λ(x, ),+∞) as shown above.
In the third step, we note that Fa|θ˜,X(a(θ˜, x)|θ˜, x) = Fa|θ,X(a(θ, x)|θ, x) thereby identi-
fying the latter up to H2(x) since θ˜ = (1−H2(x))θ. Under A4, the rest of the argument is
similar as in Case 3 leading to the identification of Fa|θ,W (·|·, ·) and then of F (θ, a|W,Z)
up to the knowledge of H2(X). We have then proved the following result.
Proposition 4: Suppose that two insurance coverages are offered to each insuree and
accidents are observed only when damages are above the deductible. Under A3 and A4,
the structure [F (·, ·|X), H(·|X)] is identified up to H2(X).
Up to now, we have not used the optimality of the offered coverages. Specifically, we
have not used the FOC (14)–(18) determining the optimal insurance coverages (t1(X),
dd1(X), t2(X), dd2(X)). One might ask whether the use of these FOC may help in iden-
tifying some features of the structure or even the full structure itself. For instance, we
note that (18) identifies a(X) because the latter solves the identifying equation
t1(X) =
θ˜(X)
a(X)
∫ d(X)
dd1(X)
(
ea(X)D − ea(X)dd1(X))h∗2(D|X)dD,
using h(D|X) = [1 − H2(X)]h∗2(D|X) and θ˜(X) = θ(X)[1 − H2(X)]. A consequence of
Proposition 4 is that the structure [F (·, ·|X), H(·|X)] is identified if and only if H2(X)
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is identified. The next lemma shows that H2(X) is not identified even when considering
coverage optimality through the FOC (14)-(18).
Lemma 5: Suppose that two insurance coverages are offered to each insuree and accidents
are observed only when damages are above the deductible. Under A3 and A4, H2(X) is
not identified.
The proof is given in the appendix. It relies on exhibiting an observationally equivalent
structure. The nonidentification may be surprising but can be explained as follows. It
arises from a compensation between the increase (decrease) in the number of accidents and
an appropriate decrease (increase) in the probability of damages being greater than the
deductible. From the insuree’s perspective, such a compensation maintains the relative
ranking between the two contracts. Thus, if a (θ, a)-insuree buys (t1(X), dd1(X)) then the
((1−H2(X))θ, a)-insuree also buys the same coverage if there is an appropriate increase
in the probability of damages being greater than dd1(X). From the insurer’s perspective,
the decrease in the average number of accidents is compensated by an appropriate increase
in the probability that the damage is above the deductible. Thus the expected payment
to the insuree remains the same under either coverage.
5 Discussion and Model Restrictions
This section discusses identification strategies for the probability H2(X) and characterizes
all the model restrictions on observables associated with the model of Case 4.
5.1 Identification Strategies for H2(X)
From Section 4.2, any assumption that identifies H2(X) identifies the structure [F (·, ·|X),
H(·|X)] on its support. We discuss some identifying assumptions/conditions for H2(X) as
well as its partial identification. A first strategy to identify H2(X) is to parameterize the
damage distribution H(·|X) as H(·|X; β) on [0, d(X)] with β ∈ B ⊂ IRq. Observations
on reported damages D∗ identify β and hence H(·|X) on [0, d(X)]. Thus H2(X) ≡
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H(dd2(X)|X; β) is identified. In particular, we can choose a parametrization to fit the
estimated truncated damage distribution H∗(·|X).
A second strategy is to consider additional data sources on the average of either the
number of accidents or the damages. For instance, suppose that for every x ∈ SX , we
know the average number of accidents µ(x) ≡ E[J |X = x] = E{E[J |θ,X = x]|X =
x} = E[θ|X = x] by A3-(iii). For the average number of reported accidents, we have
µ∗c(x) ≡ E[J∗|χ = c,X = x] = E{E[J∗|J, χ = c,X = x]|χ = c,X = x} = E[J(1 −
Hc(X))|χ = c,X = x] = [1−Hc(x)]E[θ|χ = c,X = x] for c = 1, 2 since J∗ given (J, χ,X)
is distributed as a Binomial with parameters (J, 1−Hχ(X)). Thus
µ(x) = ν1(x)E[θ|χ = 1, X = x] + ν2(x)E[θ|χ = 2, X = x]
=
1
1−H2(x)
(
ν1(x)
µ∗1(x)
λ(x)
+ ν2(x)µ
∗
2(x)
)
.
This leads to the identification of H2(x) given that νc(x), µ
∗
c(x), c = 1, 2 and λ(x) are
identified from the data as shown in Section 4.2. Alternatively, suppose that we know
only E[J |X = x0] for some x0. Using the same argument establishes the identification of
H2(x0). This combined with a support assumption such as θ(x) = θ for every x identifies
H2(x). Specifically, note that we have θ˜(x) = (1 − H2(x))θ(x), where θ˜(x) is the upper
boundary of the support of fθ˜|X(·|X = x), which is identified as shown in Section 4.2.
Applying this equation at x0 identifies θ by θ˜(x0)/(1 − H2(x0)). Applying again this
equation at different values x identifies H2(x). A similar argument applies at the lower
bound θ(x) = θ.
Regarding damages, we note that
E(D|X = x) = H2(x)E[D|D ≤ dd2(x), X = x] + (1−H2(x))E[D|D ≥ dd2(x), X = x],
where E[D|D ≥ dd2(x), X = x] is identified from the data. Thus, for every x it is straight-
forward to see that identification of H2(x) requires to know both E[D|D ≤ dd2(x), X = x]
and E(D|X = x). In particular, the knowledge of the latter is not sufficient, in contrast
to the previous case in which the average number of accidents was sufficient for identifi-
cation. As above, if one knows E[D|D ≤ dd2(x0), X = x0] and E(D|X = x0) for some x0
and if either θ(x) or θ(x) is independent of x, then H2(x) is identified for every x.
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A third strategy is to derive some bounds on the probability H2(X). This approach
also known as partial identification was popularized by Manski and Tamer (2002) and
Chernozhukov, Hong and Tamer (2007). See also Haile and Tamer (2003) and Kovchegov
and Yildiz (2009) for nonparametric bounds. Our bounds are in the spirit of the latter
as they are nonparametric. Let [F 0(·, ·|X), H0(·|X)] be the true structure. Given an
arbitrary value x, Proposition 4 implies that it is sufficient to determine the identified
set for H02 (x), i.e., the set of values H2(x) that are observationally equivalent to H
0
2 (x).
16
The proof of Lemma 5 shows that any value H2(x) = 1 − (1/κ)[1 − H02 (x)] for κ >
supx˜[1−H02 (x˜)] is observationally equivalent to H02 (x). Thus, the identified set for H02 (x)
contains the interval (
1− 1−H
0
2 (x)
supx˜[1−H02 (x˜)]
, 1
)
.
For values x for which 1−H02 (x) is close to the supremum, the left boundary approaches
zero. Hence, the identified set is close to (0, 1), which is not informative.
To tighten these bounds, we may rely on some empirical evidence in Cohen and Einav
(2007). In particular, their estimated damage density decreases when the damage ap-
proaches the deductible from above suggesting that the density below the deductible is
not greater than its value at the deductible. Thus we can assume that the damage den-
sity satisfies h(D|x) ≤ h[dd2(x)|x] for every D ≤ dd2(x) and x ∈ SX . Integrating both
sides from 0 to dd2(x) we obtain 0 ≤ H2(x) ≤ dd2(x)h(dd2(x)|x). Dividing both sides by
1−H2(x), and using the definition of the truncated density h∗2(·|x), we obtain
0 ≤ H2(x)
1−H2(x) ≤ dd2(x)h
∗
2(dd2(x)|x).
Solving for H2(x) gives the bounds
0 ≤ H2(x) ≤ dd2(x)h
∗
2(dd2(x)|x)
1 + dd2(x)h∗2(dd2(x)|x)
≡ B(x).
In particular, the upper bound for H2(x) is strictly less than 1. Moreover, a useful feature
16To be precise, this is the set of values H2(x) corresponding to structures [F (·, ·|X), H(·|X)] that are
observationally equivalent to [F 0(·, ·|X), H0(·|X)].
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of this upper bound is that it can be estimated as it depends on observables.17
5.2 Model Restrictions
This section derives the restrictions imposed by the model on observables under the data
scenario of Case 4, i.e., a finite number of contracts and a truncated damage distribution.
We can use these restrictions to test the model and its assumptions. For every insuree, we
observe [J∗, D∗1, . . . , D
∗
J∗ , χ, T,DD,X], where D
∗
j denotes the damage for the jth reported
accident and (T,DD) are the premium and deductible chosen by the insuree. From the
model, T and DD are given by T = tχ(X) and DD = ddχ(X), where tχ(X) and ddχ(X)
for χ = 1, 2 are functions of X satisfying the first-order conditions (14)-(18). Thus,
the vector of observables has a joint distribution Ψ(·, . . . , ·) with a density ψ(·, . . . , ·) =
ψD∗1 ,...,D∗J∗ |J∗,χ,X(·, . . . , ·|·, ·, ·)× ψJ∗|χ,X(·|·, ·)× ψχ|X(·|·)× ψX(·).
The next lemma provides necessary and sufficient conditions on the joint distribu-
tion Ψ(·, . . . , ·) to be rationalized by a structure [F (·, ·|·), H(·|·)] ∈ FX × HX . Let
H∗cX be defined as the set HX in Definition 2 with the difference that the support is
[ddc(X), d(X)] for c = 1, 2. We introduce the remaining notations to write the model
restrictions implied by the full support assumption and the first-order conditions (14)–
(18). The insurer’s expected payment per accident given the coverage c and character-
istics x is denoted E[P |c, x] = ∫ d(x)
ddc(x)
(1 − ΨD∗|χ,X(D|c, x))dD for c = 1, 2. Let θ˜(a) ≡
θ˜(a, x) and a(θ) ≡ θ˜−1(θ˜, x) as in (25) with H∗2 (D|X) = ΨD∗|χ,X(D|2, X). In particular,
θ˜(·) and a(·) are known from Ψ(·, . . . , ·). Let fθ˜|χ,X(·|·, ·) and fθ˜|X(·|·) be the densities
given by the moment generating functions (23) and (24) with νc(x) = ψχ|X(c|x) for
c = 1, 2 and λ(x) = ψD∗|χ,X(·|2, x)/ψD∗|χ,X(·|1, x). These densities are also known from
Ψ(·, . . . , ·). We denote by θ˜ ≡ θ˜(x) the lower bound of the support of fθ˜|X(·|·). Let
fθ˜,a|X(·, ·|·) = fa|θ˜,X(·|·, ·)fθ˜|X(·|·), where fa|θ˜,X(·|·, ·) is obtained from (26) using A4. Let
17Similarly, exploiting the relationship 1−H2(x) = [1−H1(x)]/λ(x) we obtain
1− λ(x) ≤ H1(x) ≤ 1− λ(x)
1 + dd2(x)h∗2(dd2(x)|x)
.
The lower and upper bounds for H1(x) are strictly larger than zero and smaller than one, respectively.
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[a, a] ≡ [a(x), a(x)] be the support of fa|X(·|x), while a∗ ≡ a∗(x) = min{a, a(θ˜, x)}. Lastly,
we define
ρ(x) = ψχ,X(1, x) +
∫ a∗
a
[
t1(x)−θ˜(a)E[P |1, x]
]
fθ˜,a|X(θ˜(a), a|x)
∂θ˜(a)
∂t1
da
−
∫ a
a∗
[
t2(x)−θ˜(a)E[P |2, x]
]
fθ˜,a|X(θ˜(a), a|x)
∂θ˜(a)
∂t1
da,
which expresses the Lagrange multiplier in terms of observables using (14).
Lemma 6 (Rationalization Lemma): Let Ψ(·, . . . , ·) be the distribution of (J∗, D∗1, . . . ,
D∗J∗ , χ,X). Under A3 and A4, [F (·, ·|·), H(·|·)] ∈ FX ×HX rationalizes Ψ(·, . . . , ·) if and
only if the latter satisfies the following conditions:
(i) ΨD∗1 ,...,D∗J∗ |J∗,χ,X(·, . . . , ·|·, ·, ·) =
∏J∗
j=1 ΨD∗j |χ,X(·|·, ·), where ΨD∗j |χ,X(·|·, ·) = ΨD∗|χ,X(·|·, ·)
∈ H∗χX ,
(ii) For all x ∈ SX , ψD∗|χ,X(·|2, x) and ψD∗|χ,X(·|1, x) are strictly positive on [dd2(x), d(x)]
and [dd1(x), d(x)], respectively. Moreover, their ratio λ(x) is independent of d ∈ [dd1(x),
d(x)] with 0 < λ(x) < 1,
(iii) For every (θ˜, x) ∈ Sθ˜X{
fθ˜|χ,W,Z [θ˜|1, w, z]ψχ|W,Z(1|w, z)
fθ˜|W,Z(θ˜|w, z)
; z ∈ SZ|θ˜w
}
= [0, 1],
(iv) The coverage terms t1(·), t2(·), dd1(·), dd2(·) satisfy 0 < t1(·) < t2(·), d(·) > dd1(·)
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> dd2(·) > 0, and∫ a∗
a
[
t1(x)−θ˜(a)E[P |1, x]
]
fθ˜,a|X(θ˜(a), a|x)
∂θ˜(a)
∂dd1
da+ E[J∗|1, x]ψχ,X,Z(1, x)
−
∫ a
a∗
[
t2(x)−θ˜(a)E[P |2, x]
]
fθ˜,a|X(θ˜(a), a|x)
∂θ˜(a)
∂dd1
da−ρ(x)θ˜eadd1(x) = 0 (27)∫ a∗
a
[
t1(x)−θ˜(a)E[P |1, x]
]
fθ˜,a|X(θ˜(a), a|x)
∂θ˜(a)
∂t2
da+ ψχ|X(2|x)
−
∫ a
a∗
[
t2(x)−θ˜(a)E[P |2, x]
]
fθ˜,a|X(θ˜(a), a|x)
∂θ˜(a)
∂t2
da = 0 (28)∫ a∗
a
[
t1(x)−θ˜(a)E[P |1, x]
]
fθ˜,a|X(θ˜(a), a|x)
∂θ˜(a)
∂dd2
da+ E(J∗|χ = 2, x)ψχ,X(2|x)
−
∫ a
a∗
[
t2(x)−θ˜(a)E[P |2, x]
]
fθ˜,a|X(θ˜(a), a|x)
∂θ˜(a)
∂dd2
da = 0 (29)
t1(x) =
θ˜
a
[∫ d(x)
dd1(x)
(
eaD − eadd1(x))ψD∗|χ,X(D|1, x)dD] . (30)
Condition (i) says that reported damages are independent and identically distributed
given the coverage choice and individual characteristics. In addition, reported damages
are independent of the reported number of accidents given these variables. This is a
consequence of A3-(i, ii) on damages and number of accidents. Condition (ii) requires that
the densities of reported damages, given coverage choice and individual characteristics,
are strictly positive on their supports. More importantly, the ratio of these densities needs
to be independent of the level of reported damage following (21). This property is also a
consequence of A3-(i, ii), i.e., damages are i.i.d and independent from the coverage choice
and hence from (θ, a). Condition (iii) says that the probability for choosing coverage 1 by
a (θ, a)-insuree takes all values in [0, 1] as the characteristic Z varies. This follows from
(26) and the full support condition in A4-(ii). Condition (iv) relates the distribution of
observables to the coverage terms. In particular, it requires that the optimal premium
and deductible for the two coverages must satisfy the FOC (14)-(18). There is also a fifth
condition that follows from the compact support of the joint distribution of risk and risk
aversion and its non-vanishing density in Definition 1. This technical condition is given
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in the Appendix.
The rationalization lemma is important for several reasons. First, the insurance model
with multidimensional private information does impose some restrictions on observables.
In view of bunching due to multidimensional screening, and a finite number of coverages,
one could have expected otherwise. For instance, in auction models, a restriction arises
from the monotonicity of the equilibrium bidding strategy, which is not present here be-
cause of the finite number of contracts. Second, Lemma 6 characterizes all the restrictions
on the distribution of observables that we can use to test the validity of the model and
its assumptions. Violation of a single restriction by the data would reject the model. We
can then develop some testing procedures for each condition. For instance, we can test
(i) using conditional independence tests. See (say) Su and White (2008). We can test the
independence of λ(x) from damage by noting that the ratio of the densities is equal to
ψD∗|χ,X(dd1(x)|2, x)/ψD∗|χ,X(dd1(x)|1, x). We can then derive a Crame´r-von Mises type
test relying on nonparametric estimates of the densities following Brown and Wegkamp
(2002). Condition (iii) implies that the full support assumption in A4 is also testable.
Third, (iv) provides restrictions on the coverage terms suggesting that we can test
their optimality. This contrasts with the previous structural literature in which one
assumes that the observations are the outcomes of some equilibrium. For instance, in
auctions, identification relies on the optimality of observed bids. This represents a strong
assumption that might be questionable from an empirical point of view. When the number
of contracts is finite, we do not use optimality of the coverage terms to identify the model
structure. Thus, we can use (27)–(30) to test the optimality of the observed coverages
(T1, DD1, T2, DD2) in the case of a monopoly. From an empirical point of view, the system
(27)-(30) gives the optimal coverages from observables. Hence, it allows us to assess the
profit loss for the insurer from using the actual coverages. Fourth, because restrictions (i)–
(iii) do not require that the insurer is a monopoly, they are also valid to test Assumptions
A3 and A4 under alternative forms of competition in the insurance industry.
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6 Conclusion
Our paper addresses the identification of insurance models with multidimensional screen-
ing, where insurees have private information about both their risk and risk aversion. Our
model also includes a random damage and the possibility of multiple accidents. Screening
of insurees relies on their certainty equivalence. Specifically, we investigate how data avail-
ability on the number of offered coverages and reported accidents affects identification of
the model primitives through several data scenarios. Overall, the number of accidents
plays a crucial role and we identify the model structure despite bunching due to multi-
dimensional screening and/or the finite number of offered coverages. In particular, our
identification results under a finite number of coverages apply to any form of competition.
Specifically, they identify the distribution of inusrees’ risk and risk aversion for each firm
in the industry. In addition, we provide all the restrictions imposed by the model on
observables. An interesting feature is that optimality of the offered finite coverages can
be tested separately as identification of the model does not rely on this property.
In terms of future lines of research, first our results extend to a broad range of insurance
data such as in health provided the analyst observes a repeated outcome, e.g. insurees’
claims. In particular, we may want to extend our identification results when damages are
no longer mutually independent and correlated with insuree’s private information to allow
for moral hazard. Second, in the case of automobile insurance, we could endogenize the
car choice given insuree’s risk and risk aversion. This would lead to a model explaining
the car choice, the coverage choice, the number of accidents and the damages. Third, our
identification results are constructive and thus provide explicit equations for developing
a nonparametric estimation procedure. Our model restrictions can be used to develop
a test of the model validity and of the coverage optimality. These restrictions are also
the basis for testing adverse selection in insurance within a multidimensional private
information setting. Several existing data sets on automobile and/or home insurance used
in Israel (2005a,b), Cohen and Einav (2007), Sydnor (2010) and Barseghyan, Molinari,
O’Donoghue and Teitelbaum (2013) can be reanalyzed in view of our results.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1: The derivatives of the certainty equivalences (5) and (6) with respect to θ
give −(φa− 1)/a and −(φ∗a− 1)/a, respectively. Since φa > 1 and φ∗a > 1, we obtain the desired
result. Regarding the derivative of (5) with respect to a, we obtain
∂CE(0, 0; θ, a)
∂a
= −θ
[
aE[D exp(aD)]− E[exp(aD)] + 1
a2
]
.
It suffices to show that the numerator in brackets is positive. It is equal to E[aD exp(aD) −
exp(aD) + 1]. Let X˜ = aD, it is easy to show that X˜ exp(X˜) − exp(X˜) + 1 is an increasing
function equal to 0 at X˜ = 0. Since aD ≥ 0, the numerator is positive and hence the derivative
is negative. A similar argument applies to CE(t, dd; θ, a) by letting X˜ = a min(dd,D). 
Derivation of First-Order Conditions (11) and (12): The Hamiltonian is
H(t(s), dd(s)) =
[
t(s)− E(θ|s)
∫ d
dd(s)
(1−H(D))dD
]
k(s)
+v(s)t′(s) + y(s)dd′(s) + r(s)
[
dd′(s) + η(s, a(s), dd(s))t′(s)
]
,
where t(s) and dd(s) are the state variables, t′(s) and dd′(s) are the control variables, v(s), y(s)
and r(s) are the co-state variables. The first-order conditions are
∂H
∂t′(s)
= v(s) + r(s)η(s, a(s), dd(s)) = 0
∂H
∂dd′(s)
= y(s) + r(s) = 0
−∂H
∂t
= −k(s) = v′(s)
− ∂H
∂dd
= −
[
E[θ|s](1−H(dd))k(s) + r(s)∂η(s, a(s), dd(s))
∂dd
t′(s)
]
= y′(s)
with transversality conditions y(s) = 0 and v(s) = 0. Integrating the third equation and
using the transversality condition v(s)=0 gives −K(s) = v(s). The first two equations give
K(s)− y(s)η[s, a(s), dd(s)] = 0. Using r(s) = −y(s) and (8) in rewriting the last equation give
the desired result. 
Proof of Lemma 2: Let s′ > s and θ be fixed and arbitrary. Following (6), the certainty
equivalence when buying insurance can be written as
CE(t(s), dd(s); θ, a) = w − t(s)−m(dd(s), s),
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where m(dd(s), s) = (θ/a)[
∫ dd(s)
0 e
aDdH(D) + eadd(s)(1 −H(dd(s))) − 1] and (θ, a) is such that
s(θ, a) = s. The (IC) constraints for s and s′ give
w − t(s)−m(dd(s), s) ≥ w − t(s′)−m(dd(s′), s)
w − t(s′)−m(dd(s′), s′) ≥ w − t(s)−m(dd(s), s′).
Adding the two inequalities give upon simplification
m(dd(s′), s)−m(dd(s), s) ≥ m(dd(s′), s′)−m(dd(s), s′).
Since m(·, ·) is differentiable in both arguments, we get∫ dd(s′)
dd(s)
∂m(ξ, s)
∂ξ
dξ ≥
∫ dd(s′)
dd(s)
∂m(ξ, s′)
∂ξ
dξ∫ dd(s′)
dd(s)
[
∂m(ξ, s)
∂ξ
− ∂m(ξ, s
′)
∂ξ
]
dξ ≥ 0∫ dd(s′)
dd(s)
∫ s
s′
∂2m(ξ, y)
∂ξ∂y
dydξ ≥ 0. (A.1)
Differentiating m(ξ, y) with respect to ξ gives
∂m(ξ, y)
∂ξ
= θeaξ(1−H(ξ)).
Because θ is fixed and s(θ, a) = y, then differentiating with respect with y using a(y) gives
∂2m(ξ, y)
∂ξ∂y
= θa′(y)ξea(y)ξ(1−H(ξ)) ≤ 0,
since a(·) is decreasing in s by Lemma 1. Thus, the inner integration in (A.1) is positive. Hence
(A.1) holds if and only if dd(s′) ≥ dd(s). 
Proof of Lemma 5: In view of Proposition 4, H2(X) is identified if and only if the struc-
ture [F (·, ·|X), H(·|X)] is. Thus, it suffices to show that the latter is not identified. Let
[F (·, ·|X), H(·|X)] be a structure satisfying Definitions 1 and 2 as well as A3 and A4. We
construct a second structure [F˜ (·, ·|X), H˜(·|X)] as follows. Let θ˜ = κθ with κ > supx∈SX [1 −
H2(x)] ≥ 0, while a˜ = a so that f˜(·, ·|X) = (1/κ)f(·/κ, ·|X). Let h˜(·|X) be a strictly positive
conditional density on its support [0, d(X)] with h˜(D|X) = (1/κ)h(D|X) for D ≥ dd2(X). Be-
cause 0 <
∫ d(x)
dd2(x)
h˜(D|x)dD < 1, it follows that κ > 1−H2(x) for all x ∈ SX as required above.
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The second structure [F˜ (·, ·|X), H˜(·|X)] satisfies Definitions 1 and 2 as well as A3 and A4 as
θ˜(a,X) = κθ(a,X).
We now show that these two structures are observationally equivalent, i.e. they lead to the
same distribution for the observables (J∗, D∗1, . . . , D∗J∗ , χ, t1, dd1, t2, dd2) given X, where J
∗ and
D∗ refer to the number of reported accidents and their corresponding damages, respectively,
while χ indicates which coverage is chosen by the insuree. First, we note that the coverage
terms are deterministic functions of X solving the FOC (14)–(18). Thus, from (25) the optimal
frontier for the second structure must be
θ˜(a,X) =
t2(X)− t1(X)∫ dd1(X)
dd2(X)
eaD(1− H˜(D|X))dD
=
t2(X)− t1(X)∫ dd1(X)
dd2(X)
eaD 1κ(1−H(D|X))dD
= κθ(a,X),
thereby showing that the highest risk aversion in A˜1 is a˜∗(X) = a∗(X).
Regarding the distribution χ˜ given X, we note that χ˜ = χ. The latter follows from χ˜ = 1
if and only if (θ˜, a) ∈ A˜1(X), i.e. θ˜ ≤ θ˜(a,X) and a(X) ≤ a ≤ a˜∗(X). Since θ˜ = κθ,
θ˜(a,X) = κθ(a,X) and a˜∗(X) = a∗(X), we have χ˜ = 1 if and only if χ = 1. Thus, the
distributions of χ˜ and ξ given X are the same, i.e. ν˜c(X) = νc(X) for c = 1, 2. Regarding the
distribution of J˜∗ given (χ˜,X)=(χ,X), from (22) its moment generating function is
Mθ˜|χ,X [(1− H˜χ(X))(et − 1)|c, x] = Mθ|χ,X [(1−Hχ(X))(et − 1)|c, x]
= MJ∗|χ,X [t|c, x]
using 1−H˜c(X) = (1−Hc(X))/κ, and Mθ˜|χ,X(u|c, x) = Mθ|χ,X(κu|c, x). Hence, the distribution
of J˜∗ given (χ,X) is the same as that of J∗ given (χ,X). Regarding the distribution of reported
damage D˜∗ given (J˜∗, χ,X) is
H˜∗χ(·|X) =
H˜(·|X)− H˜χ(X)
1− H˜χ(X)
=
H(·|X)−Hχ(X)
1−Hχ(X) = H
∗
χ(·|X)
using 1− H˜χ(·|X) = (1−Hχ(·|X))/κ.
Lastly, it remains to show that (t1(X), dd1(X), t2(X), dd2(X)) satisfies the FOC (14)–(18) as-
sociated with the second structure. Using θ˜(a,X) = κθ(a,X), f˜(θ˜(a,X), a|X) = f(θ˜(a,X)/κ, a|
X)/κ = f(θ(a,X), a|X)/κ, 1 − H˜(D|X) = (1 − H(D|X))/κ, ν˜c = νc and E[θ˜|A˜c] = κE[θ|Ac],
it can be easily verified that (t1(X), dd1(X), t2(X), dd2 (X)) satisfies (14)–(18) with ρ˜ = ρ as
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soon as (14)–(18) hold for the original structure. Hence, the two structures lead to the same
distributions for the observables as desired.
Additional Condition in Lemma 6:
(v) For c = 1, 2 and all x ∈ SX , ψJ∗|χ,X(·|c, x) > 0 on IN with a moment generating func-
tion defined on IR such that the right-hand sides of (23) are the moment generating functions
of absolutely continuous distributions with densities bounded away from zero on their supports
[θ˜(1, x), θ˜(1, x)] and [θ˜(2, x), θ˜(2, x)] with union equal to [θ˜(1, x), θ˜(2, x)] included in IR++. More-
over, Sa|θ˜w ≡ {a : ∃z ∈ SZ|θ˜w, a = a˜(θ˜, w, z)} is a compact interval in IR++ independent of θ˜.
Condition (v) states that the support of the distribution of reported accidents, given cover-
age choice and individual characteristics, is the set of integers. The remaining part of (v) follows
from the compact support of F (θ, a|X), and its non-vanishing density. The conditions on the
moment generating function of J∗ given (χ,X) can be replaced by conditions on its character-
istic function φJ∗|χ,X(·|c, x). Specifically, φJ∗|χ,X(·|c, x) is an entire characteristic function such
that the right-hand sides of (23) are characteristic functions corresponding to absolutely con-
tinuous distributions with densities bounded away from zero on their supports [θ˜(1, x), θ˜(1, x)]
and [θ˜(2, x), θ˜(2, x)] with union equal to [θ˜(1, x), θ˜(2, x)] included in IR++.
18
Proof of Lemma 6: We first prove necessity. Let [F (·, ·|·), H(·|·)] ∈ FX ×HX be a structure
that rationalizes Ψ(·, . . . , ·) under A3 and A4. To prove (i) we follow Guerre, Perrigne and Vuong
(2000) proof of Theorem 4 (Conditions C1-C2). From A3-(i,ii), we have (D1, . . . , DJ) i.i.d as
H(·|X) conditional upon (J, θ, a,X). Thus, J∗ follows a B[J, 1−Hχ(X)] given (J, θ, a,X) since an
18Such conditions can be written equivalently in more testable forms. For instance, a function is a
characteristic function if and only if it satisfies Bochner’s Theorem 4.2.2, and it is entire if and only if
it satisfies Theorem 7.2.1. A characteristic function corresponds to a distribution with bounded support
in IR++ if and only if it satisfies Theorem 7.2.3 with (7.2.3) strictly positive. These theorems and
equations are from Lukacs (1960). A well-known sufficient condition for a distribution to be absolutely
continuous is that its characteristic function is absolutely integrable, while a necessary condition is that
the characteristic function vanishes in the tails. See Billingsley (1995, pp.345-347).
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accident is reported if and only if the damage is above the deductible. For any (d1, . . . , dj) ∈ IRj+,
Pr[D∗1 ≤ d1, . . . , D∗j ≤ dj , J∗ = j|J, θ, a,X]
=
∑
1≤r1 6=... 6=rj≤J
Pr[ddχ(X)≤Dr1≤d1, . . . , ddχ(X)≤Drj ≤dj , Dr<ddχ(X), r 6∈{r1, . . . , rj}|J, θ, a,X]
=
J !
j!(J − j)!Pr[ddχ(X)≤D1≤d1, . . . , ddχ(X)≤Dj≤dj , Dr<ddχ(X), r=j + 1, . . . , J |J, θ, a,X]
=
J !
j!(J − j)!
(
j∏
r=1
[H(dr|X)−Hχ(X)]
)
[Hχ(X)]
J−j
because (D1, . . . , DJ) are i.i.d. as H(·|X) given (J, θ, a,X). Since J∗ is B[J, 1 −Hχ(X)] given
(J, θ, a,X) we obtain
Pr[D∗1 ≤ d1, . . . , D∗j ≤ dj |J∗ = j, J, θ, a,X] =
j∏
r=1
H(dr|X)−Hχ(X)
1−Hχ(X)
showing that (D∗1, . . . , D∗j ) are i.i.d as H
∗
χ(X) ∈ H∗χX given (J∗ = j, J, θ, a,X), and hence given
(J∗ = j, χ,X). Thus, (i) holds.
To prove (ii), we note that ΨD∗|χ,X(·|·, ·) = H∗χ(·) ∈ H∗χX thereby establishing the first part
of (ii). Moreover, ψD∗|χ,X(d|2, x)/ψD∗|χ,X(d|1, x) = (1 − H1(x))/(1 − H2(x)) ≡ λ(x), which is
independent of d ∈ [dd1(x), d(x)] and in (0, 1). Regarding (iii), for every (θ, a, w) ∈ SθaW ,
Fa|θ,W (a|θ, w) = Fa|θ,W,Z [a(θ, w, z)|θ, w, z] =
fθ|χ,W,Z(θ|1, w, z)ψχ|W,Z(1|w, z)
fθ|W,Z(θ|w, z)
,
=
fθ˜|χ,W,Z(θ˜|1, w, z)ψχ|w,z(1|w, z)
fθ˜|W,Z(θ˜|w, z)
,
for some z ∈ SZ|θw, and where the first equality follows from A4, the second equality from
Bayes’ rule, and the third equality from θ˜ = (1−H2(X))θ. Because a can be chosen arbitrarily,
it follows that the right-hand side takes all values in [0, 1]. Regarding (iv), let θ˜ = (1−H2(X))θ.
The proof then follows the last paragraph of the proof of Lemma 5 with κ = 1−H2(X).
To prove (v), we note that
Pr[J∗ = j∗|θ, a,X] =
∞∑
j=j∗
Pr[J∗ = j∗|J = j, θ, a,X]Pr[J = j|θ, a,X].
Thus, J∗ given (θ, a,X) is a mixture of a B[J, 1 −Hχ(X)] with a mixing P(θ) distribution by
A3-(iii). That is, ΨJ∗|θ,a,X(·|θ, a, x) is a P[(1 −Hχ(x))θ] distribution. Hence, ψJ∗|χ,X(·|c, x) =
45
∫
Ac ΨJ∗|θ,a,X(·|θ, a, x)dF (θ, a|x) thereby establishing ψJ∗|χ,X(·|c, x) > 0 on IN as F (·, ·|·) ∈ FX .
The moment generating function of J∗ given (χ,X) exists on IR in view of (22) since the distribu-
tion of θ given (χ,X) has a bounded support. The right-hand sides of (23) must be the moment
generating functions of absolutely continuous distributions, with densities bounded away from
zero on their supports [θ˜(1, x), θ˜(1, x)] and [θ˜(2, x), θ˜(2, x)] with union equal to [θ˜(1, x), θ˜(2, x)]
included in IR++, because they are the moment generating functions of θ˜ = (1−H2(X))θ given
(c, x), which have such properties.
We now turn to sufficiency. Let the distribution Ψ(·, . . . , ·) of (J∗, D∗1, . . . , D∗J∗ , χ,X) and
the contract terms [t1(·), dd1(·), t2(·), dd2(·)] satisfy (i)–(v). We need to exhibit a structure
[F (·, ·|·), H(·|·)] ∈ FX×HX satisfying A3 and A4 that rationalizes Ψ(·, . . . , ·) of (J∗, D∗1, . . . , D∗J∗ ,
χ,X) and [t1(·), dd1(·), t2(·), dd2(·)].
In view of the identification argument of Section 4.2, we define H(·|·) as follows: For a
constant κ ∈ (0, 1), let H(D|X) = κψD∗|χ,X(D|2, X) + (1 − κ) when D ≥ dd2(X). Note
that H(·|X) has a strictly positive density on [dd2(X), d(X)] because ΨD∗|χ,X(·|2, X) ∈ H∗2X .
For D ∈ [0, dd2(X)], let H(·|X) be arbitrary as long as it has a strictly positive density on
[0, dd2(X)]. Thus, H(·|·) ∈ HX . Note that κ = 1 − H(dd2(X)|X) ≡ 1 − H2(X) so that
H∗2 (·|X) ≡ [H(·|X) − H2(X)]/[1 − H2(X)] = ΨD∗|χ,X(·|2, X) after straightforward algebra.
Moreover, ψD∗|χ,X(D|2, X) = λ(X) ψD∗|χ,X(D|1, X) for D ≥ dd1(X) by (ii) implying λ(X) =
1 − ΨD∗|χ,X [dd1(X)|2, X] by integration, and H∗1 (·|X) ≡ [H(·|X) − H1(X)]/[1 − H1(X)] =
ΨD∗|χX(·|1, X) after some algebra. Thus, ΨD∗1 ,...,D∗J∗ |J∗,χ,X(·, . . . , ·|·, ·, ·) is rationalized given A3
as long as χ is a function of (θ, a,X) as implied by the theoretical model.
To construct F (·, ·|·) we follow the identification argument. Let f(θ|c,X) = κfθ˜|χ,X(κθ|c,X)
and f(θ|X) = κfθ˜|X(κθ|X), where these densities exist by condition (v). In particular, f(θ|X)
is strictly positive on its support [θ˜(1, x)/κ, θ˜(2, x)/κ] ⊂ IR++. Turning to Fa|θ,W,Z(·|·, ·, ·) =
Fa|θ,W (·|·, ·) by A4-(i), we follow (26). For every (θ, w) ∈ SθW , let Fa|θ,W (·|θ, w) have a strictly
positive density on its support Sa|θ˜w ≡ {a : ∃z ∈ SZ|θ˜w, a = a˜(θ˜, w, z)} = Sa|θw ≡ {a : ∃z ∈
SZ|θw, a = a(θ, w, z)} satisfying
Fa|θ,W [a(θ, w, z)|θ, w] =
fθ˜|χ,W,Z(θ˜|1, w, z)ψ(1|w, z)
fθ˜|W,Z(θ˜|w, z)
(A.2)
for every (θ, w, z) ∈ SθWZ , where θ˜ = κθ and a(θ, w, z) ≡ a˜(κθ,w, z). By (iii) the right-hand
side has the range of [0, 1] as z varies in SZ|θ˜w for every given (θ˜, w) ∈ Sθ˜W , i.e., for every given
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(θ, w) ∈ SθW . Thus, for every (θ, w) ∈ SθW and every a ∈ Sa|θw, there exists a z ∈ SZ such
that a = a(θ, w, z), i.e., A4-(ii) is satisfied. We can now extend Fa|θ,W (·|θ, w) over Sa|θw by
Fa|θ,W (a|θ, w) = Fa|θ,W [a(θ, w, z)|θ, w] using (A.2). Thus, F (·, ·|·) ∈ FX as desired.
The structure [F (·, ·|·), H(·|·)] constructed as above rationalizes ΨJ∗|χ,X(·|·, ·) because of
(23) and the uniqueness of the corresponding density. This structure also rationalizes Ψχ|X(·|·).
Specifically, by definition we have
Fa|θ,W (a(θ, w, z)|θ, w) =
fθ|χ,W,Z(θ|1, w, z)ν1(w, z)
fθ|W,Z(θ|w, z)
=
fθ˜|χ,W,Z(θ˜|1, w, z)ν1(w, z)
fθ˜|W,Z(θ˜|w, z)
.
Using (A.2) shows that ν1(w, z) = ψχ|W,Z(1|w, z) as desired. The fact that the structure ra-
tionalizes (t1(·), dd1(·), t2(·), dd2(·)) follows the argument of the last paragraph of the proof of
Lemma 5. 
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